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CRIME, THE PUBLIC, AND THE CRIME
COMMISSION: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY
Warren Lehman*
Robert Warshaw noted that "So much of official American culture
has been cheaply optimistic that we are likely almost by reflex to
take pessimism as a measure of seriousness." It is just this unthinking
encouragement of bloated expectation that leads young persons to
compare forecast with outcome and to conclude that hypocrisy and
duplicity are at work. What is asked of us is honesty; and what that
requires is a great deal more rigor in matching our performance to
our standards. It is now the only way to maintain the credibility of
those standards.
Daniel P. Moynihan*"'

I.

GOVERNMENT BY COMMISSION

HAT is the appropriate set for the mind when it mulls the
report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of J ustice?1 Should it be fine grind, as is the
professor's when he asks a student in his first class in law school
to state the case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens? 2 Or should the
running wheel be raised from the bedstone, as is so often the case
when the professor turns to review the work of a colleague? While
the latter may have the appeal of habit, there are, I think, three important reasons why one should not extend to this report the courtesies academe usually offers an individual author.
First there is the office that any commission report has to fulfill.
Such a report is intended to influence the policy decisions of governments, and it is supposed to do so directly, without the mediation of
critics. It is not an entry in the intellectual market place, where presumably error will be discovered by failure to sell. Rather, it is implied that error has been eliminated from the report by pretesting
among the commissioners and their staff, and that further discussion
is therefore unnecessary.
Just how direct this impact on policy is supposed to be is evi-
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•• Nirvana Now, ll6 THE AM. SCHOLAR 5ll9, 548 (1967).
1. PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N ON I.Aw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CR1ME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter REPORT].
2. 14 Q.B.D. 27ll (1884).
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deuced by the President's treatment of his Crime Commission report.
Some of the recommendations were embodied as legislative proposals
in a presidential message to Congress before the report was made
public.3 Moreover, the intent to protect the work from critical examination-which would reduce its political effectiveness-is demonstrated by the report's own advertising. The panegyric with which
the Commission introduces itself and its work to the public would
embarrass the publisher of memory-improvement books. I quote at
length despite a strong predisposition not to interrupt myself with
the words of others:
The report is the work of 19 commissioners, 63 staff members, 175
consultants, and hundreds of advisers. The commissioners, staff, consultants, and advisers come from every part of America and represent
a broad range of opinion and profession.
In the process of developing the findings and recommendations
of the report the Commission called three national conferences, conducted five national surveys, held hundreds of meetings, and interviewed tens of thousands of persons.
The report makes more than 200 specific recommendations-concrete steps the Commission believes can lead to a safer and more just
society.4

The reviewer by tempering his judgments-by pointing up the
good and ignoring the bad or by admiring the effort as he might for
the individual work of a colleague-unwittingly furthers the impression that the work is beyond question, and thereby does a disservice
to the community. Obviously, no matter what the credentials of its
author, a ·writing by which the sovereign is guided deserves much
closer scrutiny than the one in which an individual seeks to persuade
the mind of the public. To overlook, out of misplaced kindliness or
for unstated political reasons, the erroneous, even the merely arguable, in authoritative proposals for government activity is an intellectual sin.
A second reason for a less than charitable approach is the possibility that the President's Commission on Crime and the Administration of Justice just might be a typical presidential commission. It
has been suggested that "government by commission" may represent
a late and promising development in the governance of democratic
societies. 5 The argument is that in most western countries the power
3. Crime in America: The President's Message to Congress Recommending Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Legislation for the Control of Narcotics, Firearms, and
Wiretapping (delivered Feb. 6, 1967), 3 "WEEKLY CO?,{PILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DocuMENTS 182 (Feb. 13, 1967), 113 CONG. REc. 985 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1967).
4. REPORT at V.
5. Bell, Government by Commission, THE Ptra. INTEREST, Spring 1966, at 3, 6-9.
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to initiate legislation has slipped from the grasp of legislators and
been taken up by national executives. The threat of such a development has been given many names-Boulanism, Gaullism, the cult
of personality. The question posed when political power is centered
in the executive is how, other than by removal of the executive, 6
shall public opinion influence policy. Without at least some opportunity for initiative from the citizenry one can hardly call one's government a democracy. Daniel Bell (following de Jouvenal) has suggested that the commission may solve this problem by bringing to
the executive the views of the people.7
The report of the Crime Commission calls into question Bell's
optimism, for that report reflects not the mind of the community but
that of the Administration. A Presidential commission (one is
tempted to generalize) is a pride of domesticated intellectuals and
leading citizens willing to sacrifice their disagreements in hope of
drinking at the springs of power. This hope is a snare and a delusion:
the commissarial lions jump to the whip of the politician. And it is
the lion-tamer whose reputation is enhanced by the lions, not vice
versa.
A commission does more to enhance executive power than to
subject it to neodemocratic restraint. A commission report lends to
a President's legislative proposals whatever authority the commissioners have. Moreover, a commission as a source of legislative
initiative has a tactical advantage over a legislature. The commission
can provide a complete legislative package. The legislature, by contrast, has too much on its mind to devote eighteen months to a
wide-ranging examination of large topics; it lacks the staff that
can be provided a presidential commission; and, because its members' positions on many issues will have to be part of the public
record, a legislature's program is likely to be limited to those items
upon which individual legislators dare publicly agree. (The Commission members did their work behind closed doors to avoid exactly
that problem.) 8 The completeness of a commission package enhances
the attractiveness of each of its components, and the whole is, there6. This route is open in any society, though its accomplishment may be more or
less difficult. Where deposing the sovereign is the only route open, the public cannot
talk but only scream. Insofar as only the most gross improprieties are reachable
through deposition, that process bears some similarity to the constitutional limitations
on the legislature exercised by courts under the rubric of substantive due process.
See E. FREUND, STANDARDS AMERICAN LEc1sLATION 274 (Phoenix ed. 1965).
7. See Bell, supra note 5, at 9.
8. "(S]ecrecy has served ••• a ••• need ••. for consensus among individuals each
of whom represents a constituency in American public life." MacKenzie, The Compromise Report on Crime, NEW R.EPtrauc, Feb. 4, 1967, at 15.
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fore, greater than the sum of its parts. Finally, a legislator cannot
afford to ignore the support that the President builds for himself,
through the publicity that attends his commission's reports, among
the legislator's own constituents.
The additional legislative influence that a commission report gives
to the President might be tolerable if the report were either an independent and comprehensive intellectual effort or a reflection of the
concerns of the community. In fact the Crime Commission report
was at least as much a report of the President to the people as it was
a report of the commissioners to the President. And even so far as it
was the report of the commissioners, it gave voice not to the opinions
of the people but rather to political compromises between the criminal justice establishment and what Daniel Moynihan might call
doctrinaire liberalism.9 Qames Q. Wilson began his review of the
Commission report by pointing out that it was not organized to answer the questions an intelligent layman would want to discuss;
rather, it was organized "around the existing institutional machinery
for handling criminals.")10 If the President can significantly influence
the content of a commission report, and if the report is also the result
of closed-door political compromises, it is doubtful that the commission format provides an acceptable solution to the perceived problem
of bringing public opinion to bear upon government.
If our first reason for refusing the report's claim of special respect
is because of what it is intended to accomplish (we may well have to
live by its suggestions), our third reason for denying it that respect
is because of what the report is. If the report is a narrowly political
document, it is an inappropriate device for determining long-range
policy issues. It is hard to imagine anything more inappropriate than
allowing such policy decisions to be made, without criticism, by those
closely bound to the politics of the present. The future ought not be
defined by what is politically possible now. It is equally hard to
imagine that policy proposals made by those restricted by the politics of the present are not peculiarly susceptible to error-error in
description of the problems of both the present and future, and
hence in the solutions suggested. At the very least we should not
9. Moynihan, Nirvana Now, 36 THE AM. SCHOLAR 539 (1967).
10. Wilson, A Reader's Guide to the Crime Commission Reports, THE PUB. INTER•
EST, Fall 1967, at 64, 64-65. Wilson in this and an earlier article (published before
the Commission Report), Crime in the Streets, THE PuB. INTEREST, Fall 1966, at 26,
has contributed much to my understanding. I owe him especially profuse thanks for
this gift as I am guilty of having, on the basis of an incorrect quotation, made some
nasty cracks about him in Thinking Small About Urban Renewal, 1965 WASHINGTON
U.L.Q. 396-97. He was kind enough to point out my error with humor rather than
rancor.
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allow the authors of a report so suspect in origin to rush us into
action, and yet that is exactly what they would do.
The rush is betrayed by the framework of the report. In the most
general terms, the argument of the report is that the problem of
crime in America has reached crisis proportions11 but that we can be
optimistic about solving that problem if only we carry out the Commission's specific recommendations. 12 Both of these propositions, at
least as they will be understood by most readers, are false. Neither
are we so badly off as the Commission implies, nor are we justified
in any optimism that things will get measurably better in the next
twenty years. The dramatics are peddled to us so that we may eagerly
and unquestioningly support the Commission's conclusions and its
recommendations.
Yet, a presidential commission could indeed provide a most useful service, especially when its subject matter is one about which the
public is both anxious and ill-informed. In such circumstances the
commission has the chance to replace phantasms with information,
to replace worry with thought, and to give direction to an inchoate
desire to act. The opportunity is a precious one, for a commission is
in a unique position to reach not only those specialists for whom its
subject matter is of daily concern but also the whole of the literate
public. No individual scholar can hope to attract a hundredth part
of the circulation, a hundredth part of the press coverage, but such
attention is the commission's by right. The opportunity is precious
not only because the whole of the public will be reached, but because
the same subject will not in a generation be considered under the
same circumstances again. If the subject has not been exhausted, potential authors will have been, and so will the patience and purse of
the community.
The duty of a commission is commensurate with the uniqueness
of its opportunity and with its unparalleled power to affect legislatures and the mind of the public. Measured by its duty, the Crime
Commission was a failure.
It was not a failure because of its inability to find the answers to
admittedly hard questions. If anything, it failed because it pretended
to have answers. It failed because to a public seeking guidance it dissimulated, equivocated, and avoided. It failed because, withal, it postured as a revolutionary committee. Likely, it seems, the failure was
inevitable for a modem political commission. I provide something
ll. "The criminal justice system is faced with too urgent a need for action to stand
back for a generation and engage in research." REPORT ll!.
12. REPORT at vi.
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of a history that others may judge whether this failure was an accident or an inevitability.

II.

THE TRANSMUTATION OF GOLDWATERISM

A single startling event appears to have begun the process by
which a formless public concern about crime was played upon,
molded, and remolded to suit the needs of politicians. The authors
of the report were only the most recent to get on the bandwagonto take advantage of crime having become a national issue.
In New York City early in the morning of March 13, 1964, Winston Mosley murdered Kitty Genovese. To accomplish the murder,
Mosely made three separate attacks with a knife over a period of
half an hour. Thirty-eight people were wakened by the victim's
screaming. A light flickered on, a shout from a window served to
interrupt the killer, but no one seriously raised a hand to stop the
mayhem or even to call the police, until, after the third attack, Miss
Genovese was dead. 13 The event received only the most routine attention from the press14 until the police discovered how many people
had seen the crime committed but done nothing. A comment from
the dismayed police commissioner to the city editor of the New York
Times led to a page-one story on March 27, two weeks after the
event.15
The story of the thirty-eight frightened or apathetic witnesses
made headlines across the country and occasioned a spate of editorial
self-examination of which the Times' What Kind of People Are
We? 16 was probably typical. Religious leaders, psychologists, and sociologists were asked to analyze the problem.17 We were concerned
because the thirty-eight people were ourselves, able to look passively
on while a woman was murdered. So discomfited were some that they
rose to attack the police or to call for penal legislation for silent witnesses.18 But the basic theme was self-examination.
That examination continued into July, until the eve of the Republican National Convention. The weekend before the convention,
publication of a book on the Genovese murder was announced in
13. See Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call Police, N.Y. Times, March 27,
1964, at 1, col. 4. The article is reprinted, with additional matter, in A. ROSENTHAL,
THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES 29-45 (1964).
14. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 14, 1964, at 26, col. 4.
15. See A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 13, at 19-25.
16. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1964, at 18, col. 2.
17. E.g., Mohr, Apathy Is Puzzle in Queens Killing, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1964,
at 21, col. 1.
18. See A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 13, at 53-57, 68-70.
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the Times. 19 A few weeks before, the murderer had been condemned
to death before cheering spectators.20
One cannot but believe that the Genovese murder had affected
Dwight Eisenhower as much as it had the rest of us. And when it
came time for him to address the convention, he chose to divert but
once from his purpose of party peace-making-to discuss individual
moral responsibility for solving, among other things, the problem of
crime on the streets: "[I]n the home, in the school and the church is
a great field where the aggregate influence of dedicated concerns
among the local citizenry can be applied with revolutionary impact
on all these evils." 21 This response was appropriate to the view that
the thirty-eight witnesses evidenced a moral decay that could be
cured only by a reassertion of individual virtue. Moments later, however, Eisenhower betrayed a sympathy with those New Yorkers who
had sought to shift the blame from themselves. The convention was
aroused by the unbecoming statement that we should not be "guilty
of maudlin sympathy for the [apprehended] criminal, who [had
been] roaming the streets with switchblade knife ... seeking helpless prey ...." 22 It was that latter remark, not the former, which
was to set the tone when it came time for Barry Goldwater to offer
leadership in defining the crime problem for an unhappy public.
That, perhaps, is not surprising; it was those who cheered the Eisenhower remark-the radical conservatives who had gained control of
the convention-who were to be responsible for Goldwater's nomination.
If Eisenhower's individual responsibility theme had been occasioned by the Genovese murder, his crime repression theme, symbolized by the switchblade knife, may well be attributable to the experience of another New York City girl. Shortly before the convention
opened, Miss Arlene Del Fava had drawn a switchblade knife from
her purse and used it to fend off a would-be rapist. The attacker was
apprehended, but so was Miss Del Fava-for carrying the knife. She
said that she had done so because she did not "want to be another
Kitty Genovese." 23 Miss Del Fava was finally discharged by a grand
jury, but not until the day after Eisenhower's address. The Del Fava
case provided an unfortunate counterpoint to the Genovese case.
The disgruntled observer, anxious to rid himself of any blame for
19.
col. 3;
20.
21.
22.
2!1.

The book was A. RoSENTIIAL, supra note 13. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1964, at 33,
Nichols, Book Review, id. July 12, 1964, pt. VII, at 10.
See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1964, at I, col. 6.
Id., July 15, 1964, at 20, col. 8.
Id.; Rovere, Letter From San Francisco, THE NEW YORKER, July 25, 1964, at 77.
N.Y. Times, July 16, 1964, at 33, col. 6.
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Kitty Genovese's death, could easily convince himself either that the
assumption of individual responsibility was useless or that analyzing
the crime problem in those terms was irrelevant. It was a convenient
psychological release, a phony double-blind that restored the sense
of righteousness.
Before Eisenhower's address there was no evidence that either
Goldwater or Republicans in general had any intention of emphasizing the problem of crime in the national campaign. Goldwater
had not attended to the subject previously and it was not being seriously considered by the Republican platform committee.24 But in
a press conference before his acceptance speech, Goldwater, asked
what he foresaw to be the issues of the campaign, said, "I think ...
the abuse of law and order in this country is going to be [an] issueat least I'm going to make it one because I think the responsibility
has to start some place." He did not suggest that it should begin with
the extirpation of the silent witness in ourselves. Instead, he asserted,
to the surprise of many, that "responsibility should start at the federal level with Federal courts enforcing the law." 25 Then he cited
as an example of the sorry pass to which we had come the fact that
a New York girl was being held for carrying the knife with which
she had defended herself; while, he said, the attacker is probably
going to get a medal. 26 Even after so clear a statement no one seriously believed that Goldwater would make crime a campaign issue.27
But, of course, he did.
24. See Rovere, supra note 22, at 77:
The origin of this commendable but somewhat novel resolve [to solve the prob•
lem of crime in the streets] is not clear. Goldwater exegetes say that it never has
been a theme in his earlier writings and speeches. There were intimations of it
in the platform-talk. of "moral decline and drift" and an indictment of the Johnson administration for "encouraging disorderly and lawless elements"-but a national remedy for crime is not among the many good things the platform promises.
Rovere, A Reporter at Large, THE NEW YoRKER, Oct. 3, 1964, at 201, 202:
For two or three years now, a number of reasonably intelligent people have been
studying Goldwater and Goldwaterism as intently-and in some cases almost as
morbidly-as Cotton Mather ever studied the doings of Satan and the manifesta•
tions of witchcraft. But not even the most assiduous and imaginative of Goldwaterologists was prepared for the Senator's emergence in San Francisco as a
candidate for High Sheriff as well as for President.
25. Rovere, supra note 22, at 77. The quotation is repeated by Rovere in A Reporter at Large, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 1964, at 201, 202-03, but the concluding
phrase, "with federal courts enforcing the law," is dropped.
26. See N.Y. Times, July 17, 1964, at 11, col. 8.
27. See Rovere, A Reporter at Large, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 1964, at 201, 202-03:
Goldwaterologists in the Cow Palace and across the country were stunned [by
Goldwater's reference to crime in his acceptance]-and stunned again ••• in a
press conference the following morning [when he made the statement quoted in
the text] •••. [Goldwater was vague when asked for detail, and] Goldwaterologists assumed that this was about the size of it-the Republican candidate would
continue to take a stand against "bullies and marauders" but would not undermine his whole position as a strict Constitutionalist by proposing any specific
strategy of intervention.
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It seems both more appealing and more reasonable to believe that
Eisenhower's statements reflected the honest feeling of a concerned
official rather than that they were a trial balloon the Goldwater
forces induced him to set free. It is difficult to base a political campaign upon the moral rearmament of the electorate; to be a really
useful political issue, a public concern must be appropriate for governmental action. The mutation in the Eisenhower position implied
in his switchblade knife remark, Goldwater's assumption of federal
responsibility-these were the grounds for a political campaign. Yet
the conjunction was probably an accident-an irresponsible seizing
upon issues that seemed attractive because they had been so lately
in the public eye. The day after the convention Goldwater could
suggest-as a federal function in crime fighting-only his own prospective moral leadership as President.28 His later expansion of the
possibilities for federal responsibility had the earmarks not of dissimulation and controlled exposure but of discovery. If the choice of
campaign issues was this kind of accident, Goldwater was blessed
with the luck of the Princes of Serendip.
The moral turpitude and apathy themes had been used by the
platform committee, developed by the press in analyzing the Genovese case, and would appeal to the righteous and simple whom Goldwater counted among his supporters. More important, the "big city
crime problem" meant "the Negro problem" to many. There was
already supposed to be a backlash among moderate whites against
excesses in the civil rights movement. Goldwater could say, "as the
President, I am going to do all I can to see that women can go out
in the streets of this country without being scared stiff"; 29 his audience, racist and backlash, could be expected to read "white" before
"women" and to picture as the threatening aggressor the Negro male
in all his animal virility. In addition, there was the United States
Supreme Court which had added coddling criminals to the list of
sins for which the John Birch Society was anxious to condemn it.
The crime problem as a political platform provided a simple means
of courting just those groups whose support Barry Goldwater needed,
without Goldwater having to wear his-or Robert Welch's-heart
on his sleeve. The advantages of this approach were missed by neither the political commentators30 nor Barry Goldwater's own advi28. See id. 203.
29. Quoted in Rovere, supra note 22, at 77.
30. See id. at 78:

Before the Convention, [Republican delegates] seemed at a loss for a way to court
the racist vote in the North without making racism an article of the new Republican credo. But a way it seems has now been found, and the candidate who says
he has moral scruples about the principle of segregation seems positively cxhil-
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sors. As election neared, a Republican policy team recommended
that the campaign issues be narrowed to a few. First on the list was
moral decay; second was the crime that decay produced. Foreign
policy issues followed. 31
There was one problem with the crime issue: how could a constitutional fundamentalist square his call for federal leadership in
crime control with his support of states' rights? How, in fact, could
anyone transform the need for law and order in the streets into a
federal problem? Goldwater was vague when he was asked for an
explanation the day after the convention. "He said a few words
about creating an improved 'moral climate' by force of presidential
example, and some about bettering the quality of the federal judiciary."32 A few days later he was more specific: his plan included
replacing present law enforcement officers with persons who understood that the important thing about law enforcement is to put criminals behind bars; getting Congress to overrule the Mallory rule by
statute; 33 filling the court with appointees who would "redress Constitutional interpretation in favor of the public"; 34 and supporting a
constitutional amendment that would "give back to the states those
powers absolutely needed for fair and efficient administration of
criminal law."35
The moral decay, the decay of which the Republican policy committee had spoken, was not attributed to Goldwater's intended constituency, but to some undefined others-Northerners, city-folk,
Negroes, teenagers, criminals; the blank could be filled in according
to the listener's predispositions. And these undefined others were to
be dealt with by invigorated local and federal law enforcement. The
concerns aroused by the Genovese murder and reflected in Eisenhower's speech had been perverted. It was not now the good who
had grown weak so much as it was the bad who had grown strong.
Though it was obvious that Goldwater had struck a responsive
chord-the public was worried about crime and at least a significant
segment of it apparently welcomed the opportunity to put the blame
on others-Lyndon Johnson reacted as the incumbent presidential
arated by the thought of a campaign against mugging, stabbing, rape, housebreaking, and other well known interracial activities. By this extraordinary means,
he can seek the backlash vote without for one moment agreeing-or even, perhaps
acknowledging to himself-that that is what he is doing.
31. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1964, at 28, col. I.
32. Rovere, supra note 27, at 203.
33. See id. 204.
34. Id.
35. Quoted in id. 206.
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candidate in a happy and prosperous nation. 36 It was politically inexpedient for him to dispute Goldwater's analysis of the crime problem during the campaign; hence, Goldwater's was the only voice
attempting to define for the public the way in which the crime problem should be viewed. Johnson's only response was to scoff at the
notion that crime was a problem for the federal government's concern. When he was asked about the crime issue after the Republican
convention, Johnson said, "Well, I think I should remind all of you
that the United States is one of the few nations which does not have
a national police force. The Constitution provides that responsibility
for law and order should be vested in the states . . . ."37 By late
September, however, it was obvious that the crime issue was disturbing him, for he described federal antipoverty and education programs
as evidence of the Administration's concern with crime.38 By implication, activities such as those, which might affect the causes of crime,
defined the proper limits of federal activity in crime control.
Goldwater's promise to do something about the problem of crime
in the streets was the most successful of his campaign appeals. Within
four months of Goldwater's crushing defeat at the polls, Johnson,
now a President elected on his own, sent a message to Congress in
which he called crime "a malignant enemy in America's midst" and
proposed to deal with it as a national problem.39 That Johnson
adopted the Goldwater theme to his own ends was no accident. His
doing so undercut a Republican monopoly of the crime question,40
moved toward a reconciliation with at least the moderate among
those who voted for Goldwater, and directed his own considerable
energies to what many believed was a problem of crisis proportions.
However, grabbing the Goldwater banner was not an easy thing for
36. Id. at 217, and especially 225-26.
37. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1964, at 56, col. 5.
38. See id., Sept. 25, 1964, at 81, col. 5.
39. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, 21 CONGRESSIONAL Q. .ALMANAC
1394 (1965).
40. Johnson's political acumen and foresight have proved no less sensitive than one
has been led to expect. Governor Ronald Reagan of California is already attempting
to resurrect for the next presidential campaign the problem of crime in the streets.
Hill, Reagan Says War Is Election Issue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1967, at 25, col. 2.
The Ballad of George Romney begins:
The wind atop Mt. Washington is singing Romney's right George Romney's right
-the spread of crime and violence must cease George Romney's right • • • •
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 21, 1968, at 1-D, col. 2.
This Article was written last winter. Today, after the Republican Convention, one
need hardly cite anything for the proposition that crime remains a national political
issue, It is overshadowed in the debates of the presidential year by more immediately
pressing international problems, but it remains an issue of obviously intense feelings,
and which is still viewed as an appropriate and major subject of national political
concern.
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a Democratic President to do. He could not concede any of Goldwater's explanations for the crime problem. He had to support the
Supreme Court. He could not place the blame for crime on Negroes.
He could not admit to moral decay either in his Administration or
in the city dwellers of the Great Society. And he had to invent a
federal role in criminal justice administration that satisfied the Constitution, the ideology of his liberal supporters, and the need to
appear actually to be doing something.
The presidential message in which Johnson announced his intent
to create a crime commission must be about the dullest political masterpiece on record. It bears the mark of J ohnsonian prose, but it deals
in one way or another with each of the problems Johnson faced in
trying to convert Goldwaterism to his own use. The statement begins
with the non sequitur, almost obscured by verbal legerdemain, that
because crime is a nationwide problem it is therefore a problem that
should be dealt with by the federal government. 41 The idea of federal responsibility £or local law enforcement, a notion developed by
chance and embraced in desperation by Barry Goldwater, ridiculed
but a few months before by Johnson, had become a major theme of
the Great Society. There remained two problems: dissociating Johnson from Goldwaterism and deciding just what the federal government might do.
Johnson began his attack on Goldwaterism with the statement
that "It is not enough to reflect our concern . . . by seeking out
single answers or simple answers. They do not exist." 42 Then he
dealt with the conservative's simple answers. With respect to Negro
responsibility, Johnson pointed out both that the disadvantaged
are less likely to respect the law and that not all crime is committed
by "those denied equal opportunity."43 The charge of moral decay
was met with examples of youthful concern and activity in social
welfare areas. 44
The problem of the Supreme Court was a little more difficult to
handle. The President admitted that misunderstanding had existed
between law enforcement officers "and some courts," then added,
"We need to think less about taking sides in such controversies and
more about our common objective: law enforcement which is both
fair and effective."415 That the balance was to be struck by ignoring
41. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, supra note 39.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the controversy became clear only when, later in the message, Johnson directed the Crime Commission (whose creation he was announcing) to discover "[W]hat steps can be taken to create greater
understanding by those involved in the administration of justice at
the state and local level of the efforts of federal courts to ensure
protection of individual rights." 46 In other words, the Commission's
role was less to consider the merits of the balance toward which the
Court appeared to be moving than it was to convince the community
that it could live with the Court's decisions.
There were, however, two of Goldwater's positions from which
Johnson did not retreat. He did not challenge the notion that a
crime crisis existed. Perhaps more important, he did not return to
the introspective approach to crime, the approach that had gained
temporary ascendancy following the Genovese murder. Crime, one
may infer from the report that the Commission produced for
Johnson, was to be viewed in the more comfortable way-as the
business of an anti-society from whom the good can and should be
protected by governmental activity.47 "Almost every recommendation in [the Crime Commission report] is a recommendation to
State or local government ... ,"48 and those that are not are recommendations to the federal government. But one commissioner, Miss
Genevieve Blatt, was disturbed. In her "additional views" Miss
Blatt said that the report was deficient in neglecting the fact that
"godlessness [is] a basic cause of crime," and, she added, "religion
. . . a basic cure."49 We need not share her religious faith to be
surprised that the Commission makes so little point of the notion
that a citizen ought not "shop syndicate."

III.

THE VIRTUE OF UNANIMITY

Having put Goldwater down, Johnson-if he was to insist there
was a crime crisis-had now to produce his own program. Considering his penchant for creating commissions,50 it is not surprising
46. Id. at 1396 (emphasis in original).
47. There are expressions to the contrary in the report, but they usually take the
form of pious afterthoughts.
48. REPORT at 279.
49. REPORT at 302.
50. "[I]n recent years, the number and variety of Government commissions have
expanded enormously, and these commissions seem to be developing into a new and
unanticipated mechanism of government." Bell, supra note 5, at 6. We may infer that
the tendency is not unique to President Johnson.
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the proliferation of government commissions lies in the government's difficulty in categorically denying responsibility for
the parody Iron Mountain Report [L. LEWIN, REPORT FROM !RON MOUNTAIN ON THE
PossmII.ITY AND DESIRAllILITY OF PEACE (1967)]. The editors of TRANS·ACTION said:
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that he chose the commission format for his fact-finding and advisory machinery. The Commission he created to "inquire into the
causes of crime ... and make recommendations for actions which
can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments, and by private citizens and organizations . . ." 51 consisted of nineteen members52 who were given a budget of one million dollars 03 and told
to report in eighteen months. 54
It was not because Johnson was without ideas, or without agents
able to generate them, that he needed a commisison; many proposals
for federal action were already available. When Johnson announced
his intent to create the Commission, he demonstrated independence
by also announcing that he would shortly send to Congress several
items of new crime-control legislation: tightened firearms control,
federal civil commitment for narcotic addicts, control of "psychotoxic" drugs not then covered by federal legislation, and a raft of
other proposals, said to be forthcoming from the Attorney General,
to deal with organized crime. 55 These were all items which, though
already incorporated in the President's program at the time the
Commission was created, the Commission was later to consider as if
they were new ideas. One of these, the civil commitment proposal,
was enacted while the Commission still had it under advisement.
If Johnson had no great need for the suggestions that the Commission was to produce, he did need the assurance that he was doing
everything that a safe opinion would say the federal administration should do. He needed a specification of the limits of federal
responsibility, and he needed one supported by people who would
carry weight not only with his liberal democratic supporters, but as
importantly with Goldwater supporters who might be converted. 06
Trans-action has found that those readers who take [the Iron Mountain Report]
seriously tend to be Government officials. Upon inquiry, sources very close to the
White House were authorized to say that the files and libraries of the E.xecutive
Office of the President have been reviewed, and although some reports in the
general subject area covered by the Report were found, there was no record of
this particular report. These sources believed, therefore, that no comment was
appropriate at this time. Informally, they observed that their statement does not
rule out the possibility that the Report was sponsored either in White House, by
some Congressional committee, or by some other agency of the Federal Establishment.
Comment, Social Science Fiction, TRANS-ACTION, Jan.-Feb. 1968, at 7-8.
51. Exec. Order No. 11,236, I "\\TEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 8
(1965).
52. Twenty members were authorized. Id.
53. S. REP. No. 602, 89th Cong., 1st Ses. l (1965).
54. Exec. Order No. 11,236, supra note 51.
55. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, supra note 39, at 1395.
56. The commissioners "were chosen cross-sectionally the way the Warren Commission was chosen and partly for the same purpose: to calm the country down.
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From the President's point of view, the political limitations on
the kind of report to be produced were, though quite specific, fairly
wide. The report should not transgress programs and ideals to which
Johnson was already committed; it ought to give the federal government something to do; and it ought to be authoritative.
Unanimity among an appropriately diverse group of commissioners is the key to authority, and the selection of an appropriately
diverse group of commissioners is an art. The modern Executive
chooses his commissioners first for whom they represent. 57 In this
respect the art has advanced considerably over the last thirty-five
years. The members of the Wickersham Commission were apparently representative only insofar as they came from different sections of the country. 58 Geographic representation, while a consideration in the selection of the latest crime commission's members,
was a relatively minor one. The key factor today, it has been said,
is the representation of functional constituencies-groupings defined not by geography but by common interests or purposes.rm The
goal is to include on a commission persons recognized as responsible
leaders by each of the groupings that might be concerned with the
subject matter being studied. In the case of the Crime Commission,
the constituencies that needed to be represented are easy enough to
discern-for example, prosecutors, judges, police, Negroes, the organized bar. It was also necessary that representation come from
national, state, and local levels of government. One man such as
James B. Parsons, a Negro federal judge from the Midwest, could
be used to kill several birds with one stone. 60
Another purpose, and a major one, was to summon prestige behind the crime war
when LBJ was ready to take the offensive with a program of his own." MacKenzie,
The Compromise Report on Crime, NEW REPUBUC, Feb. 4, 1967, at 15.
57. See Bell, Government by Commission, THE PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1966, at 3,
6-7. Leonard C. Lewin describes the selection of the members of the fictional commission that produced the Iron Mountain Report, L. LEWIN, supra note 50, at xviii,
xxii-xxiv. One would hope the mutual examination by the commissoners of each
other's medical dossiers is a bit of an exaggeration. Othenvise the author creates a
considerable air of verisimilitude.
58. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAws, H.R. Doc. No. 722, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.,
iii (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM REPORT].
59. Bell, supra note 57, at 6.
60. The Commission consisted of Nicholas Katzenbach (chairman), who was Attorney General at the time of his appointment, Genevieve Blatt (representing state prosecutors and women), Charles D. Breitel (representing the state judiciary), Kingman
Brewster, Jr. (representing education), Garrett Byrne (representing local prosecutors),
Thomas J. Cahill (representing the police), Otis Chandler (representing the press),
Leon Jaworski (representing the bar), Thomas Lynch (representing state prosecutors),
Ross L. Malone, Jr. (representing federal prosecutors), William P. Rogers (representing
federal prosecutors), James B. Parsons (representing the federal judiciary and Negroes),
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Looked at in one way, it would appear that this kind of diversification serves the useful purpose of bringing to a commission the
characteristic positions of all those who are likely to have an active
interest in a subject. Perhaps more important from the President's
point of view, however, is the fact that the signators guarantee to
their own constituents the acceptability of the compromise embodied in the report. 61 Representation is a two-way street.
The President's problem was to pick a diversified group that
could yet be brought into agreement. The selection of the constituencies to be represented, fortunately for the President, does
not determine who shall serve as their representatives on a commission. Few groups are so constituted that the President does not
have a number of choices. The type of people required are those
one would characterize as responsible and sound-those who want
to get the job done, who are dedicated to public service, those who
are not fanatics but are willing to compromise when necessary to
achieve a more important goal-in short, people whose very virtues
can be used against them. 62
The Crime Commission's report illustrates how successful the
President can be in achieving unanimity, even among nineteen
people of diverse backgrounds and interests. Little over six pages
was required to set out the "additional views" 63 of individual members respecting a report 300 pages in length and containing over
200 recommendations affecting every aspect of criminal justice administration. As one who has recently attempted to collaborate with
a joint author in producing a book on but one small aspect of the
problems under view by the Crime Commission, 64 it is incredible
to me that essential agreement could have been reached in a mere
Lewis F. Powell (representing the organized bar), Robert G. Storey (representing the
bar), Mrs. Robert J. Stuart (representing women and the League of Women Voters),
Robert F. Wagner (representing mayors), Herbert ·wechsler (representing law professors), Whitney M. Young, Jr. (representing Negroes), and Luther Youngdahl (representing the federal judiciary). Presidential Commission, 21 CONGRESSIONAL Q. ALMANAC
630 (1965).
61. See note 56 supra.
62. See Silver, Crime American Style: The President's Commission, COMMONWEAL,
April 21, 1967, at 141: "The composition of the commission itself, a carefully bal-

anced body consisting of policemen and laymen of varying sociological complexion,
insured that certain areas would not be analyzed." MacKenzie, The Compromise Report on Crime, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 4, 1967, at 15, 16:
Byrne, the tough prosecutor, and Luther Youngdahl, the liberal federal judge, are
natural foes on civil liberties matters, but they agreed that the commission should
not seriously consider the question of talting out from under the criminal law
homosexuality involving consenting adults, effectively vetoing the idea.
63. REPORT 302-08.
64-. D. OAKS AND w. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JusrrCE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT (1968).
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eighteen months among nineteen people on 200 recommendations.
I find some consolation in the difficulties in reaching agreement
experienced by the Wickersham Commission in its report for President Hoover on the enforcement of Prohibition laws. That report
included separate statements by all eleven commissioners which in
aggregate equalled in length the report itself. 65 Of this disagreement
Chairman "Wickersham said, "as is probably inevitable when eleven
people of different antecedents and temperaments endeavor to agree
on a contentious subject [this report] is more or less a compromise
of varying opinions." 66 That such conflict, or at least its manifestation, has proven less than inevitable is probably a tribute to
Nicholas Katzenbach, chairman of the current Commision, who as
Life put it, "worked hard for unanimity . . . because the report
[was] meant not only to inform the public but also to support
Administration crime bills ...." 67
Even though it must be presumed that the commissioners, having agreed to serve, wanted to produce a useful report in the time
available, one may wonder what magic the Administration used to
induce virtually complete unanimity. The report would have been,
if anything, more useful had there been more disagreement, had the
public been made privy to the disputation that went on behind the
Commission's closed doors.
Obviously the Administration may choose whether to play up a
commission's findings, or to ignore them. A commission's report is
made to the President. He can publish it or not, and, if he does,
he can choose the time and place to assure maximum or minimum
public attention. The President's power to make an unsatisfactory
report disappear is not without limits. The commissioners may
have enough independent standing to attract the press, regardless
of the President; or his own advance publicity may make discreet
burial impossible. Still there is something of a usable veto power,
and it has been exercised. 68
65. Report and statements each ran about eighty pages.
66. WICKERSHAM REPORT 161.
67. Stolley, A. Crisis Worse Than Anyone Imagined, LIFE, Feb. 24, 1967, at 24, 25.
68. The report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and
Economic Progress was ignored by the administration, apparently because it was too
controversial. Its publication was announced in an off-hand manner and under circumstances that would tend to restrict press coverage. Bell, supra note 57, at 4-5. A
report to a presidential task force, chaired by Joseph Pechman of the Brookings Institution, which was said to approve the Heller plan for the return to the states of a
portion of federal income tax revenue, was not even published, perhaps because the
suggestion had been taken up enthusiastically by Republicans. M. Ostrow, Federal
Tax Sharing with the States, Dec. 1967 (unpublished student work at Washington
University). The U.S. Office of Education recently rejected a contract research report
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For the threat of burial to have the effect of producing a favorable consensus, the commissioners had to have reasons to want the
report published and supported by the President. They had the
very best reasons-idealism and money. The liberals wanted their
theories of the cause and cure of criminal behavior and their ideals
of judicial administration embodied in a presidential program. The
representatives of the criminal justice establishment wanted federal
support, financial and moral. 69
While I am sure that many of the Commission's recommendations are of value, I would have more confidence in them had they
been recommended by some person or agency other than this Commission. We may infer from the Commission's organization and the
short time it had to work that each commissioner had every reason
to avoid looking closely at those recommendations of his fellows that
at least in part for making unfavorable mention by name of educators and politicians.
Wyant, U.S. Rejects City School Critique, St. Louis Post•Dispatch, Nov. 16, 1967, at
1-C, col. 3. More recently, Mayor Lindsay of New York has repeatedly urged action
on the recommendations of the Kerner Commission, whose report the President seems
to be trying to forget.
By way of contrast, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF NEGROES IN THE UNITED
STATES, a recent joint report of the Departments of Commerce and Labor was
issued by the White House with considerable fanfare, including a personal sendoff by the President ..•. Not only was the Persident on hand to kick it off, but
staff members of the President's Commission on Racial Disorders were tipped to
the report as the latest word on the matter. Not only was the press specially
alerted for the report, but a copy was rushed up to one prominent academic
figure who was supposed to use it to impress business men assembled in a conference on welfare called by Gov. Rockefeller.
Kraft, The Administration and the Negro, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 3, 1967, at
3-B, col. 1. The report, says Kraft, tells "us almost nothing new about the Negro,"
comparing it very unfavorably with the Moynihan report. "No doubt there is
nothing very startling, or even important, about one more mediocre federal study.
What is startling and important is that the White House thought it was putting out
a first-class piece of work." Id. Kraft concludes that the contrast between the fanfare
for and merit of the report evidences the Administration's inability to appreciate or
make use of sophisticated information.
Leonard C. Lewin, describing the presumably fictional debate over publication of
the presumably fictional Iron Mountain Report, said:
Those who argued the case for keeping the Report secret were admittedly motivated by fear of the explosive political effects that could be expected from publicity. For evidence, they pointed to the suppression of the far less controversial
report of then-Senator Hubert Humphrey's sub-committee on disarmament in
1962. (Subcommittee members had reportedly feared that it might be used by
Communist propagandists, as Senator Stuart Symington put it, to "back up the
Marxian theory that war production was the reason for the success of capitalism.')
Similar political precautions had been taken with the better known Gaither Report in 1967, and even with the so-called Moynihan Report in 1965.
Furthermore, they insisted, a distinction must be made between serious studies,
which are normally classified unless and until policy makers decide to release
them, and conventional "showcase" projects, organized to demonstrate a political
leadership's concern about an issue and to deflect the energy of those pressing
for action on it.
REPORT FROM !RON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE xiii (1967).
69. "No matter how the crime problem is sliced in Washington, it must come out
pork ..•." MacKenzie, supra note 56, at 16.
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were not obviously objectionable, and to expect the same consideration in return. There were enough problems in dealing with disputed issues. To maintain the front, it was necessary that everyone
have a thoroughly unjustified optimism in the usefulness of everyone else's projects; hence the optimistic glow of the Commission
report. To paraphrase Robert Warshaw,7° unfortunately today we
are likely, almost by reflex, to take pessimism as a measure of honesty. ·when James Q. Wilson, who was one of the Commission's
advisors, says that there is little we can do to reduce crime short of
locking up all juveniles,71 he is inherently more believable than is
the Commission when it introduces its concluding chapter with the
statement, "America can control crime."72
The intellectual costs of consensus can be measured in areas
where we know that there was conflict. By seeing how the Commission treated issues on which the President was knmvn to have strong
views with which at least some commissioners disagreed we can get
and idea how limited is the intellectual contribution of the Commission report.
President Johnson is kno,vn to be a strong opponent of legalized
wiretapping and bugging. Apparently he feared that the Commission
would not agree with him, for he attempted to keep the Commission
from considering the subject.73 But the Commission took its mvn
head and after discussion recommended that "Congress should enact
legislation dealing specifically with wire-tapping and bugging" 74-a
position hardly likely to trouble the President. This does not mean
that the President misjudged his commissioners' biases. To the
reader who is attentive, this neutral recommendation comes as a
surprise. A page earlier the Commission clearly implied its support
70. See the opening quotation of this Article.
71. Wilson, Crime in the Streets, THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1966, at 26, 34.

72.

REPORT

279.

73. See MacKenzie, supra note 56, at 15:
Ramsey Clark, the acting attorney general, told the commission in November that
bugging is one of those "red flag items" that gets people mad and diverts attention from root solutions to the crime problem. Clark and Chairman Katzenbach
knew that there was very little the commission could tell LBJ about wire tapping
and bugging; he hates it and he wants Congess to make most of it even more
illegal than it is now. They knew then, but most of the commissioners did not
know, that the Justice Department was tracking through its criminal docket to
purge it of prosecutions tainted through eavesdropping•by•trespass. But bugging
is an issue hard to dispose of cleanly once it reaches the floor. How Katzenbach
and Vorenberg Uames Vorenberg, the Commission's executive director], another
anti•eavesdrop man, managed to let the issue reach showdown proportions [this
was written before the report was published] in the commission is still an untold
story. Very likely part of the explanation is Katzenbach's view that the wiretap
laws could use some "clarification" [clarification is all the report finally recommended] and Vorenberg's refusal to leash the gung-ho section of his staff.
74. REPORT 203.
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for the use of electronic eavesdropping devices in crime fighting. 75
The less attentive reader is likely to be taken in by the topological
device of separating the forthright opinion from the insipid recommendation. Between the two is a very long page of text discussing
bugging as a threat to privacy and the ambiguity of present law; 76
the latter provides a seemingly logical bridge to a recommendation
which, if it calls for anything, calls for clarification.
The Commission's views on recent Supreme Court decisions
restricting police activity were similarly muted; one is tempted to
say encoded. Johnson in setting up the Commission had called upon
it to defend the Court. 77 This it apparently could not be brought
to do, at least not beyond the most minimal and reluctant obeisance. 78 The solution was to make no recommendations referring
directly to the wisdom of Supreme Court decisions; a conservative
minority was left to raise the issues politely in an additional statement. That statement79 forms no part of the Commission's official
report but is described by its authors-surprisingly in view of the
original presidential mandate 80-as a venture beyond the bounds
of the Commission's responsibilities. 81
That is the end of the matter as far as the Commission's official
position is concerned; nothing which can clearly be taken as the
voice of the Commission says anything to the contrary. A commission report, however, operates on several levels. The highest is that
of the black-letter recommendations, which may be compared to the
legislative text, and to which it may be assumed the commissioners,
after close attention, for one reason or another agreed. The next
75 The Commission quoted with obvious approval the testimony of a New York
district attorney to the effect that electronic surveillance is "the single most valuable
weapon in law enforcement's fight against organized crime." It followed this quote
with its own statement that "[o]nly in New York have law enforcement officials
achieved some level of continuous success in bringing prosecutions against organized
crime." REPORT 201.
76. REPORT 202-03.
77. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
78. It conceded the propriety of restricting, after its exposure by the Wickersham
Commission, the use of the third degree, but explicitly approved no other re•
strictions (REPORT 93), refused to take a position on Miranda (REPORT 94), and conceded that the problem was one of striking a balance and that the police must be
controlled, but centered its discussion of these issues around a paragraph that dilated
at surprising length how police practice over the last thirty years had been circumscribed (REPORT 93). The result may have satisfied all the competing interests
on the Commission, but it can hardly satisfy the reader, unless he can be satisfied
by reading a statement in which he can find expressed his own opinion along with
its opposite.
79. REPORT 303-08.
SO. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
81. REPORT 308.
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level is the text of the report, in which the recommendations are
set. The text, which can be compared to congressional committee
reports, may or may not be useful in explicating the recommendations, for it is not entirely clear whether it speaks with the voice of
the commissioners or the staff. Certainly the commissioners' responsibility for the text is less complete than it is for the recommendations. Finally there are supplemental reports; 82 these appear most
often to be the work of advisors-and can be compared with the
transcripts of legislative hearings-for which the commissioners have
little or no responsibility.
It is in the chapter on the police83 that one would expect to find
the Commission making recommendations relating to the Supreme
Court's decisions on police procedure, but there is none. The text
of that chapter, like that of the discussion of wiretapping, is not
entirely consistent with the lack of any official recommendation.
Rather, the chapter is replete with secret messages from somewhere
inside the political cookie factory. Apparently a great deal of aggravation was sublimated in the suggestion that the states, by legislation
and formal administrative procedure, anticipate the Court's expected review of the stop-and-frisk problem.84 (The Court has now
handed dmvn a decision on the stop-and-frisk issue. 85) By taking such
action states could establish something of a record of necessity and
fair administration so that court review would proceed "under more
enlightening circumstances." 86 That speed was being urged to avoid
what somebody obviously considered the threat of yet more ill-considered Supreme Court decisions is a point that can be gathered
only by reading between the lines.87 In the same vein is the sug82. In addition to the principal report there are nine supplemental reports,
giving additional material on the major subjects considered by the Commission.
83. REPORT 91-123.
84. The need for legislative action to pre-empt the courts is discussed at REPORT
93-95; particular reference to stop-and-frisk laws is made at REPORT 94-95. The need
for administrative guidelines for police action is discussed at REPORT 103-06. None
of this discussion explicitly criticizes the Court. Rather, the responsibility is put
upon state legislators and local police administrators for their failure to communicate their needs to the Court. The police are put in the position of excusing themselves for having slipped their toes under the foot of the Supreme Court. The official
recommendations that administrative police guidelines be formulated is justified on
a whole raft of grounds, of which aid to the Court is but one. Most of the others
are silly, e.g., the hopeful suggestion that the guideline-producing police administrator and his staff would act like a corporate board of directors. Individual policemen
would have removed from their shoulders the burden of making ad hoc decisions.
Policemen would be forced "to ponder the nature of deterrence." REPORT 106.
85. Terry v. Ohio, 36 U.S.L.W. 4578 Gune 11, 1968); Sibron v. New York, 36
U.S.L.W. 4589 Gune 11, 1968).
86. REPORT 95.
87. The tactic calls to mind the unsuccessful attempt of James Vorenberg, the
Commission's director, to formulate standards extrajudicially through the A.L.I.
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gestion that there may be loopholes in Miranda that police and state
legislatures could begin exploring.88
But whose messages are these? They may come from disaffected
staff members who are wont to see what they can put over on their
superiors, garnering whatever solace for intellectual prostitution
can be had from whispering, "I am Lazarus, come from the dead,
come back to tell you all, I shall tell all." Or maybe it is the commissioners who "have bitten off the matter with a smile ... squeezed
the universe into a ball [and rolled] it toward some overwhelming
question. . .. " 89
To put the question of authorship demonstrates the absurdity
of the game. In doing so we concede that the significance of the
report lies not in what is said but rather in who said it, and that
the question to be asked of a commission report is not the wisdom
of its proposals but the intent of its authors.
On one issue in which the President was interested the Commission made it quite clear that there was disagreement. Johnson
had publicly supported civil commitment of narcotic addicts in the
same message in which he announced that a Crime Commission
was to be appointed. 90 Despite Johnson's having gone out on a limb,
the Commission took the position on civil commitment that "results
are still too fragmentary, and experience still too limited, to permit
anything more than tentative judgments." 91 It followed that remark
with a full page describing the arguments pro and con.92 By the
time of publication the issue was moot, for the bill had been passed.03
The frank admission of disagreement and inadequate information on this issue betrays the defeat of intellect by politics, and of
virtue by advantage, to which a presidential commission is susceptible. Lack of consensus is permissible where the issue involved
is politically unimportant; on issues where feelings run high, no
matter how reasonable the dispute that engenders those feelings,
disagreement must be submerged for the benefit of the program,
for unanimity.
Model Pre-Arraignment Code. See MacKenzie, supra note 56, and Justice Harlan's
dissent in Miranda in which he called attention to efforts underway outside the
Court to solve the constitutional problems posed during the pre-arraignment period.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 523-24 (1966).
88. REPORT 94.
89. T. S. ELIOT, The Love Song of J. Alfred Pru/rock, in COLLECTED POEMS 11, 15
(1930).
90. President Johnson's March 8 Message on Crime, 21 CONGRESSIONAL Q. ALllfANAC 1394, 1395 (1965).
91. REPORT 228.
92. REPORT 229.
93. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (Supp. 1966).
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Though President Johnson dissociated himself from the Goldwater explanations for the crime problem, he never questioned
Goldwater's assumption that the problem had suddenly reached such
dramatic proportions as would justify declaring an informal national emergency. He did not list among the duties assigned to the
Commission-in either his congressional message94 or the executive
order by which he created the Commission95-the task of measuring
the volume of crime. He was satisfied, apparently, with his own
statement that the crime rate had doubled since 1940 and since 1958
has been increasing five to six times as fast as the population
growth. 06
It was, of course, desirable that there be a crime crisis. If it is
hard to prove that it exists, it is at least as hard to prove it does
not. 07 Johnson could not easily stand up to the nation and say,
"Folks, you've all been mistaken. Them newspaper writers been
misleadin' you again." It would be hard, even if he was right. And
the easier (if not the correct) road for Johnson was also the more
attractive for his commissioners. There would have been no medals
to be handed around without a war to wage.
The fact that all participants stood a step closer to realizing
many personal goals, albeit idealistic ones, if the crime problem
had reached, crisis proportions does not prove that there has been
no crime increase. Yet surely it gives us reason to look closely at
what the Commission has to say on the subject, for the Commission,
though not directed to do so, felt compelled to ask how much crime
there is and whether there is more now than there used to be.
What constitutes a crime crisis should be an objective question.
A crime crisis would consist in an increasing crime rate, caused by
factors not likely to disappear in time, where it is likely that the
increase will be of sufficient magnitude to destroy or significantly
modify the social order and where it appears that these changes will
occur unless prompt action is taken. A crisis does not exist because
people have had called to their attention a problem that has existed
unnoticed for a long time. Nor does a crisis exist simply because a
transitory cause intensifies for a time some recognized evil. But
while the question is theoretically objective, in practice it is not.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See note 90 supra.
See note 51 supra.
Message, supra note 90, at 1394.
On the inadequacy of statistics on such matters, see D. OAKS &: W. LEHMAN,

supra note 64, at 18-27 (1968).
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We cannot know with certainty, in the present state of the social
sciences or of statistical recording, whether the tests of a genuine
crisis have been met. We must each make our own judgment from
what limited information is available.
Whatever standards we apply to define crime crises, we must
begin with a seemingly simple calculation: the total amount of
crime today compared with the amount extant at some base point
in the past. To obtain the figures we must depend upon police
reports, and these reports show, indeed, a steady increase in the
number of crimes committed since the Second World War. But that
does not answer the question. For one thing, we know that police
reports are inaccurate. Unfortunately, we don't know how inaccurate, but there are a variety of reasons for supposing that police
reports tend to exaggerate the crime increase.
The Commission considered in some detail the distortions in
our perception of the crime problem that are produced by fuller
crime reporting. 98 But, having discussed the problem, the Commission continued to behave as if the only possible interpretation of
the data was that the needed crime crisis exists. We shall explore
for the balance of this section, in the light of what is knmvn of
crime statistics, the ambiguity of that "crisis."
The Commission tells us that there is everywhere a great reservoir of criminal acts that are never reported to the police. 00 It is
possible, however, and even likely, that as the public has become
more sensitive to crime its members have reported to the police a
higher percentage of the crimes of which they are aware. This is
thought to be particularly true among minority group members,
who have long experienced high crime rates, but who in the past
have been unable or unwilling to complain. 100 It is also possible
that the automobile has brought some of those, who in earlier days
would have confined their criminal activities to the ghetto, into residential areas where the likelihood of a report to the police is quite
high. Besides both poor and rich feeling more reason to complain,
it may be that today more people of all classes feel the police can
and will do something about crimes; it seems reasonably clear that
police are on the whole more professional and less corrupt today than
98. REPORT 25-27. A further and more pointed presentation is provided in Wilson,
supra note 71.
99. REPORT 20-22.
100. See REPORT 20-22. See also Rainwater, Open Letter on White Justice and the
Riots, TRANs•ACTION, Sept. 1967, at 22, 26-27; Kraft, Ghetto Hoodlums and Police,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 17, 1967, at 3-E, col. 1.
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they have been for a very long time.101 Finally, widespread insuring
of personal property encourages people to report theft and property
damage to the police102 (and inspires at least some people to support
phony insurance claims with equally phony police reports).
It is also possible that the police are reporting more of the criminal acts they know about. A change in police reporting practices
may come about for a number of reasons: a police department, having under-reported for years in order to protect a city administration's reputation, may begin to look foolish when the crime rate
it reports falls far below that reported by cities of comparable
size. 103 Eventually, someone demands "accurate" statistics and a
large and abrupt jump in the crime rate appears almost overnight.
Moreover, as policemen become more professional they are much
more likely to make written reports of all incidents coming to their
attention; such reports provide the basis for fuller tabulation.10'
Finally, it may be that the police report more crime because as
community standards have changed so have those of the police.
Things may look serious to the policeman of today that would not
have concerned him ten, twenty, or thirty years ago. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in tabulating crime tries to make
compensation in its reported national totals when a city's police
force suddenly begins fuller reporting-a not very satisfactory
101. The reason most frequently given by respondents in the Commission's study
of unreported crime for the victim's failure to report is his belief that the police
cannot or will not do anything about it. R.fil>ORT 22. The Commission did not consider whether there was any trend in this belief, any more than it considered whether
there was a trend in failure to report generally. See note 116 infra.
Claude Brown, in MANCHU.D IN THE PROMISED LAND 405, had been looking for
Skippy, a man who had knifed Claude's mother: "I never found Skippy either. The
police found him. That was surprising, that the police would really find somebodythat they'd really look for somebody for two weeks-for having hurt somebody else
in Harlem. I guess Harlem was changing."
102. See REPORT 27. In discussing insurance, the Commission fails to note the
possibility of an increase in phony crime reports entered with a view to collecting
insurance. The point is made by Wilson, supra note 71, at 27. The Commission suggests that the high proportion of all auto thefts that are reported to the police is
evidence of the importance of insurance in getting people to report. There seem other
sufficient explanations for the unusual rate at which auto theft is reported: the value
of automobiles (it is low value thefts that go unreported); the high rate of recovery,
if not conviction (it is pessimism that discourages complaints); and the utility and
importance of the auto in most people's lives.
103. See the Commission's comparison of New York and Chicago crime rates,
REPORT 26.
104. This does not necessarily mean more accurate. A policeman has a great deal
of discretion as to what he will report as crime. In many of these instances there is
no correct answer, but a consistent definition can markedly affect the impression
created either of the success of the police in solving crime, or of the crime rate.
D. OAKS &: W. LEHMAN, supra note 64, at 20·22 (1968).
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process105-but even this procedure cannot compensate at all for
the changes that take place gradually, either in the pattern of citizen
reporting to the police or of police reporting to the FBI.106
Despite all doubt about the accuracy of police statistics, no one
questions that there has been a significant increase in the absolute
number of crimes committed in America over the last nventy-five
years-if only because there are more people in America. And
though the problem of exaggeration becomes more difficult in assessing percentages, few would seriously doubt that the number of
crimes committed has increased at a faster rate than the increase in
the number of people. Few would doubt that there are now more
crimes committed per 100,000 population than there were in 1940.
That, in a nutshell, is the crisis. That, however, is not the end but
rather the real beginning of the inquiry.
There is very good reason for believing that there has been an
increase in the rate of crime. If there were not such an increase it
would mean that our society had grown surprisingly more moral
in the last twenty-five years. Crime, we know, is committed in disproportionate amounts by certain groups in our society, most
notably by young persons. Because of the post-war baby boom, the
proportion of young people in the population has been increasing
dramatically-fast enough to change the whole tenor of our society.
Thus, if the rate at which young people commit crime remained
exactly the same over the last twenty-five years, the crime rate for
the society as a whole would have to rise. If the crime rate did not
go up, it would mean that young people today are committing crimes
much less frequently than ever before. This conclusion seems so
implausible as to justify our belief that police statistics are accurate
in evidencing at least some fairly large increase in the crime rate. 107
105. The discounting method is described in REPORT 26 and in more detail in
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 211 (1967).
106. An additional factor influencing the interpretation of crime statistics (though
not necessarily the total volume of crime) is inflation. The point at which the value
of a stolen article will support a felony rather than a misdemeanor charge has
remained unchanged, while the value of articles has gone up (or the value of money
down). The FBI's figures on theft of articles valued in excess of $50 are subject not
only to reporting but to monetary inflation. See S. ELKIN, A BAD MAN 161 (1967):
And I'll tell you something else. Science in its development of transistorized
equipment has made our problem tougher. A thief's armload today is worth
more than a thief's armload was yesterday, and a thief's armload tomorrow
will be worth even more. I foresee a time when the thief's armload will be
approximate in value to the thief's truckload of yesteryear. That's what science
has done with its vaunted miniaturization.
107. The recent migrant to the city slum raises exactly the same sort of problem
as does the juvenile. The inner city poor constitute another demographic subgroup-a subgroup witlx a high overlap with the subgroup of the young-that is responsible
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At this point, the problem of the inflation of the absolute number of crimes becomes crucial. If the crime rate has increased only
as rapidly as we would expect, considering the increase in the number of juveniles, our situation looks rather different than if the
crime rate is increasing significantly more rapidly than expected.
There is disagreement on this issue. The Commission is prepared to
allow that about half of the crime increase can be explained by
demographic changes.108 That means that the other half of the
increase is due to our becoming somehow worse as a society. Others
believe that almost all the increase in the crime rate can be attributed
to demographic changes.109 If that is true, we are no worse a society
than nventy-five years ago. The crime crisis boils down, not to our
for a disproportionate amount of crime. Like the subgroup of the young, that of
the inner city poor may be in process of transit to another status. As early as the
Wickersham Report it was clear that the ethnic groups that had graduated from the
ghetto into the upper world lost with that movement a propensity to commit crime
that some had thought genetic. That fact was determined through a commission
financed study conducted by Clifford Shaw and John McKay. 2 WICKERSHAM REPORT
338-39 (1931). The absorption of Negroes by the upper world may well be slower
than that of other groups (as it certainly has been so far), for there is no group
pushing in to replace Negroes at the bottom.
108. REPORT 28. The Commission's figure takes into consideration total population growth and the growth in the proportion of young people. While the Commission says these changes could account for 40-50% of the change, the figures on
which the Commission bases its conclusion attribute 49% of the change to these
t\vo factors. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN AssEssMENT 209 (1967). In the same appendix, The Prediction of Crime From Demographic Variables: A Methodological
Note, id. 207-10, the unidentified author attempts to determine the impact of other
demographic variables--place (urban-rural), sex, and race-in various combinations.
Some combinations, because of inadequate data, could not be computed. It was impossible, for instance, to compute the total effect of race, sex, and age. Id. at 208. A combination of changes in population, race, and place could account for a 46% increase
in crime, id. at 209. The combined effects of changes in population and age account for
the 49% increase mentioned. Obviously, the combination of race and age would account for more. The unidentified author concludes that "much of the change in the
volume of crime appears to be accounted for by these demographic changes. If it were
also possible to get arrest information for each sex and age group within each race
and place category, the proportion accounted for would undoubtedly be increased
considerably.'' Id. at 209. In implying that this study supports a conclusion that as little as 40% of the increase can be attributed to demographic changes, the Commission
acted dishonestly. The anonymous author's calculations incidentally do not include
any discount in crime figures for inflation attributable to reporting changes, except
such as the FBI makes in its Uniform Crime Reports. See text accompanying note 105
supra.
109. Wilson, supra note 71, at 31-32 reports a study, SPACE GENERAL CORPORATION,
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1965), made for the California
Youth and Adult Correction Agency. By calculating crime by age group "there is
hardly any increase in the rate at all over the period 1960-1965. And if we consider
violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) instead of all 'serious'
crimes, the increase all but disappears.'' Wilson, supra note 71, at 31. Wilson concludes, "For the present, the only sure way we know of fighting crime is birth control." Id, at 32.
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having gotten worse, but to our not having gotten better fast
enough-to our failure to improve rapidly the moral attitudes of
our young people. We could determine which of these conclusions
is correct only if we had accurate figures on the absolute number
of crimes. Without accurate figures, our judgment on the question
of whether we have gotten worse depends upon how much we choose
to discount police reports in light of the known but immeasurable
forces inflating them.
All the rhetoric of the Great Society aside, it is a rather different
thing to assert that as a society we have fallen away from standards
that had been earlier attained than to assert that we must become
suddenly, say, twenty-five per cent better than we ever have been
before to solve the crime problem. The possibility of return to a
previous height is a little less problematical than that of achieving
a height not before attained. Moreover, if improvement of the society, rather than staving off a rout, is our goal, revolutionizing the
criminal justice system seems to be one of the least direct paths
toward achieving it. A revolution in street sweeping would be arguably almost as helpful.110 If, on the other hand, it is true that we
are getting worse, that in prosperous middle age our national morality has come unhinged, we could conceivably decide that we want
to be saved from ourselves regardless of the cost in otherwise unpalatably efficient and professional policing, distasteful invasion of
privacy, 111 and inhuman remorselessness in prosecution. These are
110. The question of the usefulness of changes in the criminal justice system is
considered at greater length below. See text accompanying notes 128-37 infra. The first
proposal concerning the system that one would consider would be to increase its
capacity in the light of its seemingly inevitable increase in business. We might decide,
however, that because the demand will peak out and presumably decrease eventually,
we don't want to overbuild, i.e., build a system that will exceed demand in more normal
times. The problem is of the same type as trying to decide how many subway cars to
buy. The decision as a practical matter can be neither so few that all seats will be
filled at mid-day, nor so many that no one will stand at rush hour.
111. With all the modem gadgets. "The state of the art [of scientific crime detection] today is such that we can provide a fantastic amount of security to people if
they are willing to put up with it." A statement of Arnold Sagalyn, "the Treasury
Department's director of law enforcement,'' quoted in Anderson, Why Crime Pays,
PARADE, Aug. 27, 1967, at 6, 7. The article describes closed circuit television monitoring of buildings against burglary, odor sensors that might allow detection from the
outside of buildings of marijuana or people on the inside, and an auto surveillance
system that could detect not only theft but speeding violations. The author concludes, "Clearly, the public must make some sacrifices if crime is not to rage completely out of control." Id. at 7. A report, drafted by Professor Louis Sohn for submission to the United Nations by the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace
calls for the creation of an agency to "study the implications of scientific and technological development for human rights and fundamental freedoms • • • ." Among
other items, the report was concerned with electronic surveillance and the proposed
national data bank. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 5, 1967, at lOA, col. 1.
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the kinds of policy issues that depend on the vital but unresolved
statistical questions.
Our factual situation in respect to crime may then correspond,
as far as the Commission or anyone else knows, to either of these
models, to a combination of them, or perhaps to some others.112 If,
in the face of these analytical difficulties, the Commission had made
clear at least some of the choices open to society and the ambiguity
of the evidence on which those choices must be made, it would have
done a conscientious and commendable job, opening for reasonable
discussion the choices that face us.
Unfortunately, the Commission did no such thing. It confessed
its inability to decide whether Americans are more criminal somewhere in the middle of the chapter on criminal statistics.113 Throughout the rest of the text, however, the Commission acted as if it had
discovered that Americans are today more criminal than ever before.
A crisis mentality pervades the work, exemplified by the introductory statement that "[t]he criminal justice system is faced with too
urgent a need for action to stand back for a generation and engage
in research." 114 The Commission's commitment to one side of an
argument it admitted it could not settle is evidenced in a variety
of ways:
-The summary preceding the report, which is all that many will
read, fails to mention the statistical reservation but emphasizes one
study showing that almost everyone has committed serious crimes
112. The two models so far constructed are by no means the only possible ones. Let
me briefly suggest two others. One is that many people have become convinced there
is more crime and have changed their life patterns accordingly. This, it will be seen
immediately, may in part be a self-fulfilling prophecy, for to the extent that the
streets are abandoned by the decent and law-abiding they are available for anschluss
by the criminal imperialists of the slum. I consider it a very plausible argument that
if there has been any increase in crime it is due, via this mechanism, to more
"accurate" crime reporting. If the problem is that people believe there to be more
crime, we have yet another possible policy choice: the appearance of doing something
to fight the supposed crime increase. A doctor would call such medication a placebo.
Even if a real increase in crime followed an imagined increase, the placebo would
still solve the problem by returning the streets and parks to the law-abiding.
Another model would assume that people in our society have become increasingly
intolerant of crime, or that urban society has become too delicate and refined a mechanism to withstand the levels of crime accepted in the past as normal, though not
desirable. These two statements may simply be different ways of saying the same thing
-that as people get closer together they must place more reliance on the absence of
criminality in their fellows, else, else-well, else they will have to expend too high a
proportion of their time and energy worrying about the safety of themselves and their
property. Not wanting to spend so much time, they worry and urge upon the institutions of the state that these institutions become more zealous and effective in fighting
crime,
113. The critical reservations are expressed in point 3 of the Commission's conclusions on the amount and trend of crime. REPORT 31.
114, REPORT 13,
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and another showing that there is a great volume of crime no one
ever reports. 115
-The detailed description, in the text, of the study of unreported crime leaves the clear implication that failure to report is a
new phenomenon, and hence that the crisis is even greater than reported crime would make it appear.116
-Finally, if the crime increase is generational, no explanation is
needed for it beyond population statistics. The Commission explains
the increase in crime as a symptom of moral and social decay, thereby
clearly evidencing its psychological dissatisfaction with the demographic analysis that it was unable to reject intellectually.117
That my concern with the Commission's approach to the volume
of crime is not petty is evidenced by Life magazine's article on the
report, which was headed "A Crisis Worse Than Anyone Imagined."118 In support of that assertion Life offered the evidence of the
Commission's study on unreported crime.119 It is probably upon
this article that most reading Americans depended for their knowledge of the Crime Commission report. It was the horror stories that
115. See REPORT at v.
116. See REPORT 20-22. "Although the police statistics indicate a lot of crime today,
they do not begin to indicate the full amount." Id. at 20 (emphasis added). "These
surveys show that the actual amount of crime in the United States today is several
times that reported in the U[niform] C[rime] R[eport]." Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
Neither of the today's are necessary and there is nowhere a suggestion that the failure
to report may have been common in the past, perhaps, as far as the Commission
knows, even more common than it is now. It may have come as a shock to the commissioners that so many people fail to report crime. (The Commission was easily
surprised by the ordinary behavior of ordinary people. "Surprisingly, 23 percent
[of neighborhood business owners] were unable to give any estimate at all of the
amount of their losses due to shoplifting." REPORT at 43. Personally, I was dismayed
that 77% of small merchants would keep inventory records adequate to betray how
badly they'd been done. It's like the wife putting a notch in her bed-post every time
her husband's been unfaithful-a sort of response that would be considered unhealthy
by every lovelorn columnist I've read. The Commission may have been surprised but
its misrepresentation of the significance of the unreported crime survey was unforgivable.)
117. An outline of the Commission's causal analysis will be found in REPORT 5-6.
It includes such notions as the following:
An abundance of material goods provides an abundance of motives an'd opportunities for stealing .•.•
. • • [P]arental, and especially paternal, authority over young people is becoming
weaker.... The community's social institutions have so far not found ways to give
young people the motivation to lead moral lives; some of them have not even
recognized their duty to seek for such ways. • • • [There is an] enormous gap
between American ideals and American achievements • • • •
A city man is often . . • socially isolated from his neighborhood and therefore incapable [sic] of being controlled by it.

[N]o system ••. will rid a society of crime if there is not a widespread ethical
motivation . . • . [Emphasis added.]
118. LIFE, Feb. 24, 1967, at 24.
119. Id.
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were ultimately conveyed to the public, not the more subtle statistical reservations that raise the question of whether the horror
stories were justified. The horror stories have had their effect. The
organized bar, for instance, has swallowed the Commission report
hook, line, and sinker. 120
V.

WHAT'S THE PROGRAM?

In a way, it is unfair to respond to the Commission that there
may well be no crisis. After all, it is desirable to reduce crime no
matter what its present level. And some activities may be worth
undertaking, though they have no measurable effect on the crime
rate, simply in the name of justice, humanity, knowledge, or economy. But if there is no crime crisis we can consider proposals a
little more carefully before acting upon them. If the world has ever
been as we find it now, it will not disintegrate while we mull a
little longer the question of its improvement. Whatever the force
of the argument that we must move against present evil, though
we move in ignorance, 121 that force is adequately met by examples
such as the sanitation system that spreads disease,122 the housing
program that removes the roof from over the poor man's head, the
minimum-wage law that puts him out of work, and the consumer
credit law that drives him to bankruptcy.123 It is not better in the
fire than in the frying pan.
If the reader will concede that, absent a crisis, engaging in
thought is an appropriate precursor to taking action, he ought to
concede the same even if he thinks that there may be a crisis. The
argument is the same unless we are reasonably sure that our society
is about to collapse in a whimper of decay and fearfulness. (In that
event, we may be excused even for turning to witch doctors.) But
the Commission makes no such case. The strongest statement that
can be made with certainty is that we have some time to spend with
Mercury for nights spent long ago with Venus.
It is equally true that we need not hurry if the palliatives under
consideration bear no relation to the crime rate. Whether they are
120. See, e.g., Welliver, The President's Page, 23 Mo. BAR J. 391 (Sept. 1967).
121. The Commission poses the problem in these terms: "Crime is a continuing and
urgent reality with which we must deal as effectively as we can. We cannot await
final answers. The alternatives are not whether to act or not, but whether to act wisely
or unwisely.'' REPORT 273. That statement follows by half a page the statement that,
"what [the Commission] has found to be the greatest need is the need to know." Id.
122. See H. SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 351 (1914 ed. combined with and
published under title of SOCIAL STATICS).
123. See Satter, Consumer Credit Remedies-An Evaluation, 13 DECALOGUE J. 7
(1962).
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useful and come without unacceptable costs can be considered at
relative leisure-not because we scorn improvement, but because
we want reasonable assurance that we are improving. But whether
or not the activities commended to us may justly be undertaken for
reasons other than their tendency to reduce crime, we are bound
to consider the Commission's program in the terms in which it was
elicited and offered: as a program for reducing crime. As a first
approach to that question, we ask whether the criminal justice system is a mechanism to which we can resort with optimism in the
effort to achieve that goal. It is, after all, to the criminal justice system that most of the Commission's recommendations are directed.

A. An Expected Optimism
While the Commission presented a pessimistic view of our present situation, it presented an optimistic one of the likelihood of
success in controlling,124 nay reducing, the incidence of crime.125
(I decline to debate whether these promises can properly be attributed to the commissioners; 126 they will be so interpreted by the
public, and the commissioners are inevitably parties to them.) This
optimism was necessary if the Commission's suggestions were to be
acted upon with enthusiasm and alacrity. And it goes without saying
that had his commissioners equivocated on many of the recommendations they were to make, as they did on the federal civil commitment issue, President Johnson would not have been happy. After all,
he wanted a program, not a confession of ignorance, even though the
latter might have been more appropriate.
When the promise of improvement is first presented to the
reader, it is accompanied by an "if"-"[i]f the following [seven] objectives are rigorously pursued."127 The objectives include more
money for the criminal justice system, more research about it, more
and better people working in it, the elimination from it of injustice,
more imaginative treatment of those captured in its toils, and, finally, a better society. The seventh recommendation is for citizens
rigorously to pursue the other six, especially the five related to the
system. The imbalance between recommendations for societal improvement and those for improvement of the system sufficiently
124. REPORT 279.
125. REPORT at vi.
126. See text following note 81 supra. There is, however, internal evidence that this
view is that of the Commission: "[T]he Commission is sure that the Nation can control
crime if it will." REPORT at xi.
127. REPORT at vi.
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reflects the attention given each in the rest of the report. The imbalance may be explained by the relative ease of fiddling with the
criminal justice system; it may be explained by the interests of the
commissioners and their staff; and it may be explained by the political attractiveness of dealing with crime as an institutional problem
for which the citizenry is not really responsible. It certainly cannot
be explained by the effectiveness of the criminal justice system as a
means of reducing crime. The criminal justice system is not much
of a lever with which to move the society. 128 To paraphrase Learned
Hand: righteousness lies in the hearts of men and women; when it
dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. 129 That this
is more than an appealing aphorism can, I think, be demonstrated
if we consider why it is that most people do not commit crime.
It cannot be true that those of us who usually behave acceptably
do so out of fear of punishment; a moment's introspection should
make that clear. When we avoid evil in the normal case there is no
conflict at all-no desire to do evil deflects our course. If the contrary were true, ulcers, mental breakdowns, and alcoholism would
be not merely endemic in our society but universal. And even when
a crevice in the subconscious betrays a dark, unseemly desire, the
conscious is more likely to dispose of it in terms of right and ·wrong
(really a sensed abhorrence) than in the terms of the likelihood of
criminal punishment. If the most important factor in keeping crime
down is our shared feeling of propriety, we ought ask what the
criminal justice system can do by way of defining and strengthening
the conscience of the community.
It is clear that the criminal justice system can affect particular
judgments. By defining behavior as right or wrong, the law probably influences the judgments of many, if not most, of those who
are generally predisposed to obey the law. But influencing the judg128. Leverage can be taken here in a mechanical sense as it is when we speak of
the leverage obtained through borrowed money. The notion is related to those of
dampening and amplification discussed in D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JusnCE
SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 187 (1968). Leverage is appropriate when looking at the
problem from the actor's point of view. Amplification and dampening describe the
problem from the point of view of the system being acted upon.
129. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (3d ed. 1960). Francis Allen reached a
similar conclusion in THE BORDERLANDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59 (1964): "[I]t seems likely
that the [juvenile] court's contributions to the eradication of the delinquency will be
limited and peripheral.'' He adds, "[I]t may be true that the tendency to attribute
capabilities to the court that it does not possess represents to some degree a largely
unpremeditated effort to evade the necessity of accepting more fundamental and less
comfortable alternatives.'' Id. at 60.
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ment of the law-abiding respecting particular behavior is not the
issue here. 130 The problem with which the Commission was concerned was that of encouraging general willingness to obey laws
demanding respect for our property and persons, laws that have
already been defined and accepted by the majority as right.
Can the criminal justice system do anything in this direction?
Let us consider three mechanisms by which it might be supposed
that the system could encourage in the society's members the notion
that the law ought to be obeyed: through procedural fairness and
decency, through severity and certainty of punishment, and through
the treatment of those whom the system convicts.
Presumably some amount of criminal activity is occasioned by
a perceived unfairness in the social order, an unfairness either to
the individual criminal or to a group of which he considers himself
a member. It may be that the fairness of the legal system affects the
potential criminal's view of the society as a whole-that the system
is the society's surrogate. However, for most people the criminal
justice system is merely a relatively small element of their experience of society. 131 Under these circumstances the fairness of the
system can affect the perception of the society as a whole only when
the system creates impressions radically more or less favorable than
those created by the rest of the society. This does not mean that the
police, for instance, cannot come to symbolize oppression. It means,
however, that improvement of police practices would not much
influence the oppressed group's view of the society as a whole, or
even of the police. If occasions of police misbehavior are being
sought as justification for expressing discontent, they will be
found. 132 The weight of social inequity cannot be placed upon the
shoulders of the police with any reasonable optimism that they can
successfully bear it.
130. On the circumstances for success in that venture, see D. OAKS & w·. LEHMAN,
supra note 128, at 188-90 (1968).
131. Admittedly the police play a larger role in the life of the ghetto dweller than
in the life of the white middle class. Still the law is a relatively small part of life.
132. See REPORT 37; Parmetter, Breakdown of Law and Order, TRANS·ACTION, Sept.
1967, at 13 ("The Detroit riots started in a police raid on what is known locally with
self-conscious quaintness as a blind pig, an after-hours tavern."); L. Rainwater, Open
Letter on White Justice and the Riots, TRANs-AcrION, Sept. 1967, at 22, 26-27 (emphasis added):
There is always deep conflict and ambivalence in the ghetto over the issue of
police protection versus police harassment. The ghetto is a dangerous place
for its inhabitants, and they would like to have firm and competent police surveillance. On the other hand, that very surveillance carries with it the danger
of unjust and unseemly behavior by the police. Police rationality dictates that
anyone in the ghetto is more suspect of crime than anyone in a white middle class
neighborhood. From the police point of view, then, ghetto residents should be
more willing to cooperate by answering questions and accepting arrest. The conflict
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Improvement in the fairness of the criminal justice system,
therefore, can have only marginal effect on the moral judgments
of the potential criminal and hence on the crime rate unless the
system is so radically improved that every police, magisterial, and
judicial decision is made with the wisdom of Solomon. This result
would follow if, in determining the perceived fairness of the society,
the judicial system were as significant as the economic system; it is
the more true since quite obviously the latter is far more influential
in determining our over-all view of the social order. It follows that
a relatively minor redistribution of wealth in the society or rearrangement in the opportunity structure could be expected to have
a more radical effect than transfusing all the wisdom of the Supreme
Court into the mind of every policeman on the streets.
Perhaps the system, through the punishment it metes out, gains
the leverage with the potential criminal that it lacks in its role as
surrogate for the society. But the threat of the law is a very inadequate means of preventing crime, because it depends upon the efficiency of a notoriously ineffectual system. The cost of an efficiency
that would frighten people into acceptable behavior is not compatible with the conditions of a free society.133 If but twenty per
cent of all crimes are followed by conviction, which is probably an
optimistic estimate,134 a fifty per cent increase in the success of the
criminal justice system would increase the conviction rate to but
thirty per cent-changing the odds of being penalized from one in
five to three in ten. Such a change seems unlikely to frighten a
potential criminal very much, yet it would require a revolution in
the criminal justice system of almost unimaginable proportions.
The threat of the law is most likely to be effective with those
who, though they may be tempted to violate a specific law-evade
income taxes, for instance, or drink at prohibited times or placesalready respect the system generally and are inclined to obey its
laws. Such people, I say on the basis of introspection, fear not so
much the punishment the system on its mm can mete out (they
built into this kind of situation can perhaps be somewhat ameliorated by more
integrated police forces, and by vigorous supervision of the police to see they are
not impolite or overly aggressive. But that is no real solution to the problem.

133. See, e.g., note 111 supra.
134. A Commission field study indicated that 25% of a sample of 1,905 crimes
reported in Los Angeles were cleared by apprehension or arrest. REPORT 247-48. If
Los Angeles' experience is anything like Chicago's, half of the persons arrested never
get to court. D. OAKS &: W. LEHMAN, supra note 128, at 31-35 (1968). Further, the Commission's study of unreported crime indicates that at the very least half of all crimes
are unreported. REPORT 20-22. It is at least possible that as few as 5% of all crimes
result in punishment for the offender.
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may even wonder how they would bear up under prison conditions),
but the punishments that accrue in addition to the prison sentence
because of their very participation in and acceptance of the society.
They do not want to be thought of as bad; they do not want to be
separated from the sort of society they have become accustomed to
and value; they do not want to lose contact with their possessions.
The effectiveness of a penalty imposed by a court therefore depends
upon an already existing attachment to society. Thus, the more disaffected a person, the less leverage the system has on him, even
through fear. 135
But the question we ask is not whether the system can enforce
a grudging conformity through fear, but whether the spectacle of
other people being punished can induce the feeling that laws in
general ought to be obeyed. Certainly one would expect that punishment too uncertain or too mild would encourage the disaffection
of those otherwise disposed to obey the law. Nobody wants to be
taken for a sucker. The belief that others are getting away with
things may lead the law abiding to question their obligation to the
system. But is the opposite true within any useful limits?
The actual spectacle of criminals suffering is a pleasure today
denied most of us. At best, we may imagine the pain when, now
with decreasing frequency, a capital sentence is carried out and
publicized. We do not ordinarily spend much of our time empathizing in horror with the life of a prison inmate. That is not to say
that there is no gratification or reinforcement in seeing someone
punished. But I do not think we really need much of that kind of
reinforcement. 136 Occasionally seeing someone getting a traffic ticket
135. This is hardly an original observation. Dickens, describing the England of
1775, said:
Daring burglaries by armed men, and highway robberies, took place in the capital
itself every night; families were publicly cautioned not to go out of town without
removing their furniture to upholsterers' warehouses ... the mail was waylaid by
seven robbers, and the guard shot three dead, and then got shot dead himself
by the four • . . after which the mail was robbed in peace; that magnificent
potentate, the Lord Mayor of London, was made to stand and deliver on Turnham Green, by one highwayman, who despoiled the illustrious creature in
sight of all his retinue ...• In the midst of them, the hangman, ever busy and
even worse than useless, was in constant requisition; now, stringing up long rows
of miscellaneous criminals; now, hanging a housebreaker on Saturday who had
been taken on Tuesday; now, burning people in the hand at Newgate by the
dozen, and now burning pamphlets at the door of Westminster Hall; today taking
the life of an atrocious murderer, and tomorrow of a wretched pilferer who had
robbed a farmer's boy of sixpence.
C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 3 (Cleartype Ed., n.d.) (emphasis added).
136. The Genovese case, text accompanying notes 13-20 supra, is an unusual instance of a widespread and intense desire to see a specific crime expiated through
punishment. The psychology of such a phenomenon is an intriguing subject for speculation. In the usual case, however, there is no such widespread concern that punishment be meted out.
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or a sentence for income tax violation seems to do the job; at least
there is no evidence that people were "better" when hanging was
more frequent. 137
The allegiance of the bulk of the society is retained with a conviction rate that probably accounts for much less than twenty per
cent of all crimes committed. Allegiance is no more retained by
abstract evidence of the efficiency of the system than it is by actual
awareness of the guilty suffering. People may respond to evidence
of consistent corruption and venality,138 or to what they interpret
as an intolerable rate of crime, but in neither case is the response
really occasioned by awareness of a low conviction rate or by having
been made aware too infrequently of the guilty being punished.
Venality exposed may shake the faith of some in their duty to obey
the law. Experiencing or knowing of crime does not even do that;
rather, it elicits demands for stricter enforcement. This is to be expected, at least within a fairly wide range, because the technical
failure of the system does not call into question, as would the moral
failure, the legitimacy of the system. More efficient enforcement and
more frequent and publicized punishment probably affects the
crime rate only through engendering fear.
Finally, the criminal justice system may increase the predisposition to obey the law among those whom it convicts. In this case,
of course, we are indirectly improving society not by creating fewer
criminals, but through the cure of those who have committed crime
and been convicted. Penology is, therefore, a science with an inherently limited leverage. It can reach, except insofar as a criminal
culture is self-propagating, only the relatively few who have already
committed crime and been caught at it. But even at that we are
speaking with excessive optimism, as if, in fact, penologists know
how to prevent convicts from committing yet more crimes after
their release. There is little if any evidence that we have such
knowledge.
There is then little reason for the optimistic belief that any
manipulation of the criminal justice system will have any measurable effect upon the belief that the law ought to be obeyed, upon
our judgments of right and ·wrong, or upon our tendency to commit
137. See note 133 supra.
138. See Gardiner, Public Attitudes Toward Gambling and Corruption, 374 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. Sci. 123, 128-34. Gardiner's study of "Wincanton," "an eastern industrial city with a 1960 population between 75,000 and 200,000," id. at 124-25, indicates
that the public, while complacent toward the crime of gambling, can become sufficiently concerned when corruption is brought blatantly to its attention. But when corruption is quiet, no one worries about it.
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crime. And surely this has to be the case. A society cannot be so
sensitive to the quality of its criminal justice system that its collapse or its continuance would depend upon who was elected sheriff.
For its preservation a society must develop a wide tolerance for
variation in the quality and efficiency of enforcement. If this is true,
it follows that changes in the system will have to be very dramatic
to affect the basis of social organization-the shared belief in the
rightness of those prohibitions that make common life possible.
These arguments have particular force if the crime problem is,
as it appears in large part to be, the normal criminal activity of an
abnormally large group of young people. Juvenile crime does not
usually grow into adult crime, and the juvenile's criminal phase is
unlikely to last more than five to ten years. For any institutional
device to influence juvenile crime, it must somehow reach the youth
during this period of his life or before it. One would surmise that
the opportunities are very slight for the criminal justice system to
impress upon the young its fairness, its efficiency, or its vengeance.
For better or for worse, the moral education of the young is largely
in other hands, even in the slums. And those who reach teenage illdisposed toward the law are likely to get through their criminal
period without ever having been caught on a charge serious enough
to expect these results; yet the Commission fails to tell us so.
I cannot but believe that the commissioners know all this. The
source of their optimism really has little to do with the systemic
manipulation to which they devote so much of their attention. 140
Their optimism could reasonably be predicated only upon improvement of the society that the criminal justice system sen'es. But that
is trickery. Granted that improvement in the society was one of the
seven contingencies upon which their optimism was founded; the
truth is that reasoned hope for a significant reduction in crime
could be based upon this contingency alone, and, absent this, it
could be based on the realization of no other.
When it came time to deal with the social order rather than the
criminal justice system, the Commission was understandably short
on detailed advice. What it did, in effect, was use the Crime Commission report as another platform to plump for the usual range of
liberal and Great Society nostrums for social ills. The Commission's
advice in this area cannot be taken as a serious, independent contri139. See note 134 supra on the likelihood of anyone being caught and punished for
crime.
140. On the general problems of systematic or constitutional manipulation, see D.
OAKS & W. LEHMAN, supra note 128, at 175-96 (1968).
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bution. Its recommendations are but thinly disguised descriptions
of presumably desirable end-states.141 How one reaches those ends
the Commission cannot suggest.
While it is true that no one else knows how to improve the
society either, it is also true that others positing the same goals
at least give some recognition to the difficulties of reaching them.
The Commission can recommend housing improvement without the
least acknowledgement of sixty years of frustrated effort toward this
goal. In recommending integration, the Commission ignores the
fact that the most vociferous voices in the Negro community now
favor segregation and that many whites have been converted to the
belief that separate development ought to be the immediate goal.142
More and better teachers are demanded143 in a report that also asks
for more and better police,144 and more and better social workers, 145
and, of necessity, more and better lawyers.146 How we are to find all
of these better people, no one says, nor even who should get first
choice among them.
In a word, with respect to what is most necessary the Commission
offers the least help. Its optimism, if it is founded upon anything,
is built upon the insecure sands of received liberal welfare doctrine,
and the problems that stand between our society and that brave
new world are ignored as if they were but minor nuisances. It is
not fair to respond that detailed consideration of these issues was
beyond the scope or competence of the Commission. The Commission nowhere in its report suggests that its social recommendations
are any less well-founded than its recommendations for the criminal
justice system. No more is it an excuse to say that the Commission
141. E.g., "Expand efforts to improve housing and recreation," "Develop methods
to provide minimum income," "Develop activities that involve the whole family together," "Reduce racial and economic segregation." REPORT 293-94. (On the doubtful
value of economic integration, see Lehman, Thinking Small About Urban Renewal,
1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 396, 403, 408-10).
142. See Roberts, Afore Whites Dropping Theory of Integration, Supporting Black
Power, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 22, 1967, at lB, col. I.
143. REPORT 73.
144. REPORT 106-13.
145. "Social workers" stands here as surrogate for a variety of welfare workers,
gang workers, family counsellors, psychiatric social workers, employment counsellors,
settlement house workers, probation officers and so on. The need for these is implicit
in any number of the recommendations of the juvenile crime chapter, REPORT 55-89,
the corrections chapter, REPORT 159-85, and in the program suggested for the handling
of drunkenness offenses. REPORT 233-37.
146. REPORT 150, 151-53. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURT 152-61 for Lee Silverstein's background paper Manpower Requirements in the Administration of Criminal Justice.
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was, after all, dealing with very hard problems.147 Its optimistic
stance is exactly the source of the objection. Had it made clear the
difficulty of the problems it would have fulfilled its duty to the
public. That is exactly what it did not do.
Perhaps worse than oversimplification is a disquieting omission.
The recommendations for improvement of the social order, which
we would like to believe may ultimately reduce crime, are certain
in the meanwhile to increase it-at least in the form of demonstration and riot, and probably in juvenile and property crimes as well.
All our knowledge of revolutionary psychology indicates that the
propensity to revolt increases with relative improvement in status. 148
There is also evidence that the propensity of juveniles to commit
property crimes responds to affluence in the same way. 149 We have
to expect these results; yet the Commission fails to tell us so.
B. When Is a Crime Not a Crime?

"[T]he criminal law is the formal cause of crime, since a crime
is merely an instance of behaviour which is prohibited by the
criminal law ...." 150 Obviously, in any state of society the longer
the list of prohibited behavior the greater will the society's crime
problem appear to be. The make-up of the list, however, will be
relevant in determining what a given volume of crime means for
the health of the society. Insofar as crime statistics during Prohibition included instances of people drinking illegally, one would
question the admissibility of such statistics as evidence of moral
decay. On the contrary, one might conclude that classifying drink147. This explanation was offered by James Q. Wilson in The Crime Commission
Reports, THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1967, at 66-67.
148. If I recall my history correctly, such an explanation was offered for the French
Revolution. More apposite, however, is a recent study of Negro riots in America. From
the income, quality of education, intensity of contact with whites of Negro college
students who participated in sit-ins, John M. Orbell has concluded that "the cause of
the [Negro) revolution is the increasing proximity of Negroes to the dominant white
culture-the closer Negroes come, the more strongly they demand their share."
Roundup of Current Research, TRANS-ACTION, Oct. 1967, at 4. William Styron puts
the following words into the mouth of Nat Turner, the leader of an 1831 slave revolt:
"Does it seem a hopeless paradox that the less toilsome became the circumstances of
my life the more I hoped to escape it? That the more tolerable and human white
people became in their dealings with me, the keener was my passion to destroy them?"
(Quoted in Platt, Review, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1968, at 14, 15). Orbell did not
find, however, that increasing contact with whites produced increased animosity.
149. See Toby, Affiuence and Adolescent Crime, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE!'ORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 134 (1968).
150. J. MICHAEL&: M. ADLER, CRIM1i:, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 20 (1932).
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ing as a crime had exaggerated the crime problem. But I do not
intend primarily to consider whether "overcriminalization"151-the
use of criminal sanctions in inappropriate situations-results in
exaggeration. Rather, I intend to look at some social problems
raised by unquestioning enforcement of the substance of today's
criminal law.
What behavior can appropriately be called criminal has recently
generated a fair amount of discussion. Unfortunately, most of the
discussion, at least in this country, has been directed to academic
audiences.152 The Commission had the opportunity to increase participation in the debate, but instead, it approached the topic so
gingerly that a reader who was not already familiar with the terms
of the debate could not understand what the Commission was saying. At the level of the final report, the Commission considered
decriminalization as a possibility only in relation to marijuanasmoking and public drunkenness. 153 Professor Sanford Kadish, serving as a Commission consultant, tried to get the Commission to
consider whether we should legalize gambling, abortion, narcotics,
and deviant and extra-marital sexual relations. The substance of his
paper is now available in the Annals of the American Academy of
Political Science. 154 It is a strong and forthright piece that could
have been readily adapted to bring to a wide audience the issues
involved. A chapter in Task Force Report: The Courts was based
upon Professor Kadish's paper. 155 Of this chapter, Professor Kadish
says, "[T]he controversial character of [the] issues, and the need to
achieve consensus . . . quite understandably required some reduc151. The term, as handy as it is barbaric, is apparently accepted in the trade, Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 .ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF PoL. Sci. 157
(1967).
152. E.g., DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959); GREAT BRITAIN COMMITIEE
ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT, COMMAND No. 247 (1957) (The
Wolfenden Report); H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); Kadish, supra note
151; Schelling, Economics and Criminal Enterprise, THE Ptm. INTEREST, Spring 1967, at
61. The 'Wolfenden Report demonstrates that government commissions need not avoid
touchy subjects, at least in England. Such a report must also have resulted in bringing
to a wider audience in England the question of reducing restrictions on private sexual
activities.
153. In respect of marijuana it recommended only study of the issue. REPORT 22425. Presumably by way of compensation for this daring suggestion, the Commission in
respect to all other drugs generally followed the hard line of the Federal Narcotics
Bureau. REPORT 219-21. In respect of drunkenness it expressly recommended "decriminalization." REPORT 236. There is a brief but not at all pointed discussion of the
enforcement of morality at REPORT 126-27.
154. See note 151 supra.
155. Substantive Law Reform and the Limits of Effective Law Enforcement, PRESI•
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINisrRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 97-107 (1967).
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tion in scope and muting in tone .... " 156 But even the muted task
force report is not the Commission report. When the subject was
strained once again by the Commission, it was reduced to a single
page in which the issues are not only muted but virtually invisible.157 Of course, the Commission makes no recommendation. For
all practical purposes, the Commission worked on the assumption
that the criminal law ought to be taken and enforced as found.

I. Classifying Crimes
In questioning whether or not behavior should be classified as
criminal, "[t]hinking of 'crime' as a whole is futile," 168 unless one
is content to deal on an ad hoc basis. The Commission, however,
provides no general guides for thinking about crime in useful categories: "The causes of crime, then, are numerous and mysterious
and intertwined. . . . No one way of describing crime describes it
well enough." 159 Doubtless true. It is, however, equally true that
without at least some categories, imprecise though they may be, it
is impossible to look at crime except as a whole.
I venture, therefore, some rough and overlapping categories to
aid in thinking about the subject. The criterion chosen is the manner in which the individual who violates the law views his own
behavior-whether he thinks it is appropriate behavior for all members of society. I intentionally avoid asking whether the law ought to
enforce morality, because the terms of that debate can be misleading.
While it is true that the law is not co-extensive with morality, it is
equally true that the core of that which is called criminal must be
felt to be immoral. The question as a practical matter is which
moral judgments the law ought to enforce and which ones it ought
to leave alone. One possible answer is that proscription is, in terms
of the legitimacy of the law, safe in proportion as those who commit
the proscribed behavior concede its impropriety and, but for special
justification, avoid it. 160 It is obvious that the views of the delinquents toward various proscribed behavior would form something
156. Kadish, supra note 151, at 158. Though Professor Kadish was quite polite
about it, it seems reasonable to believe that he was rather piqued at having that chapter attributed to him [PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 2 (1967)] when it reflected only a
muted version of his paper. It would appear that his article, supra note 151, provided
him an occasion for setting the record straight.
157. REPORT 126-27.
158. REPORT 3.
159. REPORT 18.
160. This answer, it must be noted, does not tell what should be proscribed, but
only what can be without a range of deleterious consequences.
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like a continuum. For purposes of analysis, however, we can construct models at each end and at the middle of that continuum.
There are, first of all, acts like rape, murder, and robbery which
almost everyone outside of the criminal community views as improper. Even the criminal, if he has otherwise rationalized his behavior, may view such acts as improper in most circumstances. These
are acts, in other words, which virtually no one would assert should
form the basis of a categorical imperative. As long as these acts are
committed for what the actor sees as idiosyncratic reasons, we are
dealing ·with what might be called "ordinary" or recognized crime.161
The legitimacy of the law is not likely to be called into question by
even the most stringent enforcement of laws prohibiting ordinary
crime.
A second class of criminal behavior includes a range of activities
about which the society as a whole is, and its members as individuals
are likely to be, ambivalent-behavior that the society hopes to minimize and keep out of sight, but which no one expects to eliminate
completely. Prostitution is the classic example, but probably most
consensual crimes-crimes without victims-have fallen at one time
or another into this category. In respect to each of these crimes one
must ask whether the costs of suppression exceed the advantages of
prohibition. Abortion is an obvious case. Making abortion criminal
probably results in many needless deaths among the customers of
shady medical practitioners-deaths that would be avoided were it
possible to obtain an abortion in a hospital. It was costs such as this
that Sanford Kadish wanted the Commission to bring to the public's
attention.
In the third class of crime there is a denial by the perpetrator of
any impropriety. Actually two subclasses are recognizable. The first
involves acts which are considered by some not to be inherently immoral; the perpetrators consider their behavior consistent with a
categorical imperative. The rule can be stated either in negative or
positive terms: in respect to no one should this act carry opprobrium
or criminal sanction, or, everyone should engage in similar actions.
We can call these moral crimes. 162 Obvious contemporary examples
161. The term "ordinary criminal acts" is used by Dean Francis Allen in Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1967).
162. For most homosexuals, homosexuality is probably closer to a moral crime than
to an ordinary consensual crime. Those who engage prostitutes (and perhaps prostitutes themselves) probably view their behaviour more often as ordinary (consensual)
crime. Drug use is probably in process of change from ordinary to moral crime, at
least with respect to "soft" narcotics and hallucinogens. The difference is important
for the legitimacy of the specific prohibition involved and can be significant for the
legitimacy of the whole system.
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include homosexual behavior and the use of narcotic drugs. In both
instances guilt feelings have been suppressed, the behavior is engaged
in, and assertions are commonly made that it should not be illegal.
The second subclass includes a miscellany of usually minor crimes
engaged in as a means of expressing discontent with the social order.
We can call these acts protest crimes. The specific forms of criminal
behavior engaged in are probably not thought by the perpetrators to
be consistent with a categorical imperative. Persons who, for instance,
make private property unusable by "sitting-in" probably would not
want a society in which it was impossible to protect generally against
invasions of private property. 163 But they may believe that people
who are confronted with a perceived evil are bound by a categorical
imperative to express their concern through violation of laws they
would normally respect.
2. Moral and Protest Crime

The impression that there is a crime crisis is doubtless heightened
by the publicity given to moral crimes and crimes of protest. 164 These
crimes attract attention and induce abhorrence. They do so because
their commission either questions the most basic values that guide
the lives of the majority or threatens a comfortable, convenient, and
familiar social order. 165 The observer's abhorrence is readily translated into a perceived moral decay in the observed. Moral decay, unAmericanism, and like terms are convenient dumping grounds for
163. While this position may be adopted formally by demonstrators, there is evidence that lawbreaking is contagious. See Allen, supra note 161, at 30-37 (1967).
164. Despite the relative insignificance of the harm they cause. See id. at 19:
The harms to persons and threats to public order than can in any fair way be
traced directly to the activities of modern protest groups shrink into insignificance
when compared with those associated with murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries, and larcenies that for generations have disfigured life in our cities.
This statement may seem too strong after the Newark and Detroit riots but probably
is not.
Because my purpose is different from Dean Allen's, I lump together here civil disobedience (which is of its nature public, see id. at 9) and, for instance, deviant sexual
behavior when engaged in by those who believe it should not be illegal (such behavior is likely to be engaged in in private). Secret law violations considered morally
justified may not cause such obvious disruption as has been attributed to civil disobedience, supra note 163, but the difference is of degree, not kind.
165. Dean Allen, id. at 21-24, discusses the difference in public reaction to ordinary
and sociopolitical crime. Recognizing the latter to be considerably more disturbing to
the public, he attributes the stronger reaction at least in part to the fact that sociopolitical crime constitutes "a fundamental challenge to the sovereignty of law." Id. at
24. It strikes me as unlikely that the disturbed among the public see the problem in
such abstract terms. It is possible to draw this inference insofar as the law embodies an
acceptable moral code and supports a familiar social organization. But I think it not
the threat to law but the threat to what the law embodies that gives rise to the concern.
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all that we perceive and do not like. Only with the guidance of informed discussion will the public learn to distinguish betwen rape
and the use of mariju;ma, or between mugging and protesting. But
making such distinction is necessary not only properly to inform the
public, but also to provide a sound basis for policy.
In a sense, it is improper to describe moral and protest crimes as
crime at all. Those engaging in the proscribed behavior, and often
many observers as well, will deny the presence of immorality that is
the basis of ordinary crime. When organized or self-conscious groups
take this position on many issues or with any frequency the community is faced, no matter how it chooses to view the situation, with
something different from an ordinary crime problem. On a purely
pragmatic level, it is quickly discovered that suppression of moral
and protest crime is peculiarly ineffective. Instead of inducing fright,
suppression raises martyrs. Instead of discouraging repetition, it encourages it. The observer may choose to defend his shaky moral
superiority, to continue to insist on the decadence of the revolutionaries, but if he is to fight with any hope of success, he must take a
careful and objective measure of the enemy.
It is not self-evident that the legal order ought to enforce the
criminal law in dealing with moral and protest crime. 166 The legal
order might better look to its mm self-preservation. The criminal
law can be called upon to perform at least two intellectually distinguishable functions, which we can call social and political. In contrasting these functions, the issues will become clear.
On the one hand, the legal system can enforce, and thereby reinforce, the basic norms shared by all members of the society. It can,
in a word, enforce the ordinary criminal law. In doing so, the legal
system acts as an integral element of the social structure; probably,
because common to all societies, it is an element necessary to hold
societies together. When the substantive criminal law is limited
to prohibitions against ordinary crime, the legal system is performing
a purely social function.
The substantive criminal law probably never corresponds completely to the moral sense of the community. Through discretionary
enforcement, legal fictions, and so on, disparities can be tolerated.
166. I depart again from Dean Allen on this point. See id. at 14. I imagine I depart from many others, as well. However, it should be emphasized to make clear the
limits of the disagreement that I am addressing myself to law enforcement agencies
rather than to those engaged in or considering civil disobedience. That I might offer
to enforcing agencies this year the advice that follows does not mean I would not offer
to Dean Allen's audience much the same advice he so articulately and persuasively
offers.
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But when a majority and minority coagulate into recognizable
groups, so that the criminal law is seen by the victims as a device for
imposing the will of one upon the other, then the criminal law becomes a political tool. At least three consequ-ences follow: the law as
a general organizing institution is discredited in the the eyes of the
suppressed; the law becomes tied to the political fortunes of the
majority, whose tool it has become; and enforcement, because normal levels of effort are inadequate, must be stepped up dramatically
to produce a tolerable conformity to law.
In performing its social function, law enforcement, without seriously affecting the amount of crime in the community, can be extremely inefficient in putting criminals behind bars.167 Consensus
on proper social behavior performs the basic job of protecting the
society from disruption. When consensus collapses or a majority
attempts to use the criminal law to enforce its policy judgments, however, consensus cannot come to the aid of the criminal justice system,
and it is on its own in the fight against the minority. Consequently,
it m,ust try to achieve a much higher rate of success in apprehension
and conviction. Of necessity, it must turn to techniques appropriate
in a totalitarian state. When the criminal law does so, its claim to
provide the ordering basis of the society is yet further weakened: not
only is it called upon to enforce unacceptable laws, but it is compelled to use unacceptable techniques in doing so.
Enforcing the will of the majority is exactly the position that the
criminal law should avoid. When the legal order is put in that position it may justly question, in the interest of self-preservation, its duty
to enforce the law. The continued vitality of the system may then depend upon its not attempting the degree of enforcement attempted
in respect of crimes proper; it must know when to give in and when
to overlook. (When enforcing laws against ordinary crimes, it need
never do so, though for reasons unrelated to the legitimacy of the
system it may choose to do so.)
As a practical matter, such discretion is not likely to be encountered once issues become polarized. The police are unlikely to
respond with tolerance to an implied threat. (The Detroit riot of
1967 was triggered by a police raid on an after-hours tavern-a blind
pig. One may ask whether the police would have overlooked the
violation had they been explicitly threatened, as a response, with the
possibility of a riot. It seems unlikely. Yet it is perfectly conceivable
167. See note 134 and text accompanying notes 134-37.
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that many policemen-even those not paid off-would have chosen
to wink at a liquor law violation.) Even were the police inclined to
temporize, if their decisions were visible the possibility of criticism
would probably discourage them. Differential enforcement cannot
easily be indulged as a public or even a conscious policy, and no
verbal justification for such a decision is likely to be found satisfactory. The only thing that makes discretionary negative charging decisions possible is their invisibility.
Nonetheless, discretionary enforcement is not to be condemned
out of hand in cases of moral or political crime; there is no corresponding universal disapproval of discretion in enforcement with
respect to other minor crimes. There is no reason why discretion
should not be indulged in appropriate circumstances to avoid greater
evils, as long as it is done quietly. But except for such occasional
exercise of political judgment in essentially political matters, there
is little that the criminal justice system can do that is not simply
defensive. The problem of accommodating to changing morality and
of minimizing the destruction, disorganization, and injury that may
result from political crime does not rest comfortably in the hands of
the criminal justice administration. The real problems are political
and social and must ultimately be resolved by other means. The criminal justice system can only do its best at holding down the fort until
assistance arrives from the legislature or until a new consensus
develops.
In neglecting to point out these problems, the Commission again
failed to help the community think about crime. At the same time,
it garnered for its crisis theory whatever support was to be found in
public concern with moral and protest crime. In taking advantage
of this public concern as an occasion to increase the effectiveness of
law enforcement, it may be that the Commission will have speeded
revolution rather than stayed it.

3. Is Gambling a Sin?
It is the consensual crimes that have raised the question whether
the law ought to be used to enforce morality. 168 Because the wisdom
of the laws against a whole range of consensual crimes has been canvassed in two recent and excellent articles,169 I shall not attempt
another survey. I want to emphasize only one particularly glaring
168. See the sources cited in note 152 supra.
169. Kadish, supra note 151; Schelling, supra note 152.
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example of the Commission's refusal to question the substantive
definitions of the criminal law: its refusal seriously to ask whether
gambling ought to be legalized.
Faced with a similar issue, the Wickersham Commission, though
it could not bring itself to recommend repeal of the eighteenth
amendment, at least asked honestly whether Prohibition was a good
thing. In doing so, it doubtless aided public understanding of the
issue. Had the current President's Commission asked the same questions with respect to gambling-even concluding that gambling
should still be prohibited-it would have performed a corresponding
service to the America of this decade. That it failed to do so, in the
face of two facts, is a woeful comment on the Commission.
The first fact is made clear by the Commission's mvn assertion:
gambling is, as alcohol was forty years ago, the rock upon which
organized crime is built. The Commission had before it-indeed, it
gives us-the salient facts. 170 The take from gambling each year is
seven billion dollars. Second to gambling, the two most lucrative
black market activites are loan sharking and the sale of narcotics, and
the income from gambling is twenty times that of either of the runners-up. Gambling accounts for eighty per cent of all income from
supplying illegal goods and services. Perhaps more striking is the fact
that if you add up all of the costs of crime-including not only criminal income but the costs of the police and the court system, of insurance and legal fees, of earnings lost by the victims of violent crime,
of private protection services-gambling accounts for a third of the
the cost of crime in the United States. The income from gambling
each year is two and one-half times the total cost of running all of
the nation's police forces. By defining this industry as criminal we
take its vast income from the hands of government and legitimate
business and deposit it in the hands of the syndicate. There it will be
put out at profit by loan sharks, used to finance the infiltration of
criminals into legitimate business, and invested in the corruption of
the police. What are the social gains to counterbalance such costs?
It is hard to believe the Commission missed the implications that
were so plain in its own statistics. (On the bar graph illustrating the
cost of crime, the bar representing gambling was too long to fit on
the page.) 171 One might forgive, if not condone, this lapse if the
Commission had any reason to fear that the public would disapprove
the mere mention of the possibility. But the second disturbing fact
170. The figures that follow are read or interpolated from the chart in REPORT 33.
Statements in the text, REPORT 32, cannot be directly correlated with the chart.
171. See REPORT 33.
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is that in this time of affluence it seems unlikely that any strong voice
would have assailed the White House had the Commission asked the
question. Gambling, unlike homosexuality or the sale or use of
narcotics, is not considered a sign of depravity by any significant
element of the population.172 One could have hoped that a sympathetic understanding of the plight of the homosexual and the addict
would have stiffened the Commission's backbone and led it to face
those problems, regardless of the possible hue and cry. No such
moral support would have been needed to ask, with respect to gambling, whether we should continue its prohibition.
Why, then, did the Commission not do so? The kindest explanation is that commissions, like regulatory agencies and legislatures,
share with courts the problem of detecting or being moved to respond
to diffuse public interests. 173 With gambling there are no squeaky
wheels, no obviously localized public costs, no touching victims. No
one has any serious difficulty placing a bet, hence there is no strong
movement by frustrated consumers. The syndicate has, through organization, internalized external costs, with the result that there is
little bloodshed. 174 There are, as far as one can tell by the paper,
fewer people led to financial ruin by gambling than are led there by
the hire-purchase plan. Who is to complain that gambling is illegal?
Surely not the syndicate.
Less charitably, it has been suggested that the Commission failed
to ask the question because of its dependence on enforcement agencies, which have "(to put it mildly) a vested Parkinsonian interest
in perpetuating criminal definitions of the conduct they are called
upon to regulate." 175 It has been argued that the Commission wanted
the agencies of criminal justice to participate wholeheartedly in
their own Commission-recommended reform; and that to win cooperation the Commission, besides accepting existing definitions of
crime, hid its eyes from police corruption, 176 included in its recommendations a great deal of money for enforcement agencies,177 and
172. John A. Gardiner in his study of Wincanton found that 88% of those interviewed thought bingo should be permitted, 59% favored a state lottery, and 55%
favored legalizing all gambling. Gardner, supra note 138, at 126.
173. On the courts, see, e.g., Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 383, 403-04 (1908). On regulatory agencies, see, e.g., Note, The Law of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of Intervention, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 416.
174. See Schelling, supra note 152, at 65-66.
175. Silver, Crime, American Style: The President's Commission, COMMONWEAL,
April 21, 1967, at 141.
176. Id. at 142. The reference following the index entry "Police corruption" reads
"see police misconduct." REPORT 336.
177. MacKenzie, The Compromise Report on Crime, NEW REPUBuc, Feb. 4, 1967,
at 15, 16.
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larded its report "with encomiums to such agencies as the FBI and
the Narcotics Bureau."178
Whatever the reason, the Commission missed an opportunity to
call attention to a question the public ought to be asked to consider
in an informed way. With its vast prestige, the Commission could
have prepared the way for a genuine revolution, one which would
have significantly reduced crime and given law enforcement agencies
a fighting chance against an enemy that can now buy and sell them.
The idea is simple enough: legitimate competition will in time replace criminal organization in supplying such services as gambling
if and when the supplying of such services becomes a legitimate business in which others can enter. I know this thesis to be questioned.
There is, however, ample evidence of its truth. I cite three examples.
The most obvious, perhaps therefore the most likely to be overlooked, is that traffic in liquor, once the mainstay of organized crime,
is now a trivial part of criminal business-illicit liquor costs about
seventy-five cents per person per year in the United States while
gambling costs thirty-five dollars per person.179 In another field,
the syndicate in New York is selling out its interest in homosexual
bars because legitimate businessmen are, as a result of reduced police
pressure, entering the market in competition with organized crime. 180
Perhaps more apposite, gambling in Nevada, thought to have been
run by the syndicate even though legalized, is even now being taken
over by legitimate business. The erratic Howard Hughes has been
buying about everything in sight in Nevada, including a number of
casinos. More important, since passage of a law permitting corporations to own casinos, 181 other legitimate corporations have been going into the gambling business.182 Certainly this will mean a dramatic
reduction in organized "skimming," with the result that the govern178. Silver, supra note 175, at 141.
179. Figures extrapolated from the table in REPORT 33.
180. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1967, at 10-I, col. 1:
A more tolerant attitude by police and the liquor authority towards bars that
cater to homosexuals-plus an increasing social tolerance of deviates-has induced
legitimate businessmen to invest in such places. This has broken the near monopoly enjoyed for years by Mafia.
181. 5 AUTOMATED STAT. REP. 98, Nev. Stat. 470-77 (1967), amending NEV. R.Ev. STAT.
463.170 (1967).
182. See Starr, Why Is Howard Hughes Buying Up Las Vegas?, LooK, Jan. 23, 1968,
69, 73:
Governor Laxalt is a number one fan of Hughes: "His coming here did things for
our state image that a multimillion-dollar public relations campaign couldn't
have achieved," says the Governor. He has given Nevada gambling instant
respectability. The Governor wants out-of-staters to take notice that Nevada has
for several years been making a shift from the old methods of financing
gambling casinos through an assemblage of partners to the corporate way,
with open bookkeeping and open methods. The Del E. Webb Corp., a Phoenix construction company, has moved into Nevada gaming, and so have several
other corporations. Last spring, the Nevada legislature made it possible for the
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ment will get more taxes. Almost certainly it will mean that gambling income will not be used for criminal purposes or be shipped
outside the United States; rather, it will be reinvested in legitimate
business.
"Decriminalization" is, unlike other methods previously mentioned, a crime-fighting technique with very considerable leverage.
The result is not simply that gambling is no longer a crime, so no
longer included in criminal statistics. Eliminating the need for police
protection will eliminate the need to corrupt the police. Petty gamblers and small-time bookmakers will no longer be so readily subject
to extortion. And the time of the criminal justice system previously
devoted to dealing with gaming offenses can be devoted to fighting
other more serious criminal activity. The salutory influences of
legalization multiply rather than dwindle.
The trouble with the Crime Commission's program is not that it
was unable to answer hard problems. Reducing crime is not easy.
The trouble with the Crime Commission is that it directed our attention to the less fruitful among the possibilities for action open to us,
that it dug over familiar ground rather than put its prestige on the
line.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I mentioned to a friend in law teaching that I had in progress a
criticism of the Crime Commission report. He said I must be taking
it far too seriously. I assume his position was that of the authors of
the Iron lifountain Report: that there are, as distinct from serious
studies, "conventional 'showcase' projects organized to demonstrate
a political leadership's concern about an issue,"183 and that the Crime
Commission report was one of the latter.
I cannot believe that it was not intended, at least by the majority
of those involved, to be taken seriously. I know or know of and respect too many of those who participated in preparing the Commission report. I£ I ask whether those several hundred people would
readily give up as much as eighteen months of their lives to particifirst time for a corporation, and not just individuals, to get a license to run a casino.
Federal authorities concerned over crime-syndicate influence in Nevada gambling, cautiously share Laxalt's optimism. "Vve can see a change already," says a
top U.S. enforcement official. "A number of old-timers are still around, but increasingly, untainted investment money is being attracted here." It is noteworthy
that after Hughes took over the casinos, employees had to fill out personnel questionnaires, while thorough investigations were made of key people.
OF

183. L. LEWIN, REPORT
PEACE xiii (1967).

FROM !RON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY
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pate in a public relations gimmick, the answer has to be no. It would
be an insult not to take these people seriously.184
The consultants, the advisors, and the staff, as far as I know,
could have been consultants, advisors, and staff to a group producing
a thoroughly creditable report. Perhaps even the commissioners, or
people of the same sort, but in different mix or under different
auspices, could have produced a creditable report. But it could not
be done in the turgid, perfumed air of the capital. Everything conspires against good results-the pressure of time, the influence of the
Administration, and not only the human failings of the participants
but their virtues as well.
The President wanted not so much to deal with crime as to deal
with public concern about crime. The commissioners came to Washington expecting to deal with the former; they left having dealt
with the latter. In the process of transformation, the commissioners
became parties to the most insulting of political views toward the
public: that the public, like a woman, is to be coddled and courted
but not taken seriously. They exuded optimism, rode roughshod
over legitimate controversy, and hid from the public the ideas they
thought unpalatable.
The reasons are many for being disturbed about the Crime Commission report. I have limited myself to the more general ones
because these are the easier to overlook. One's sympathy with specific
recommendations can easily distract attention from the radical
failure of the report. And it was a radical failure, almost certain to do
more harm than good. When everything we know presages increases
in crime, the Commission's unrealistic optimism, its groundless
promises of success in the war against crime, are just more mud on
the face of a distrusted liberalism. The Johnson Administration
probably will not suffer; as long as the Viet Nam war lasts, no significant effort will be made to follow up the Commission's recommendations; and only when the time and money have been invested will the
futility of the effort be recognized. The problem of dealing with a
public that discovers it has been duped will be left to a future
President. But the reckoning will come for today's politicians or
their heirs, just as, unfortunately, it will for the cause of liberalism.
The young will no longer accept well-intended busy-work as a substitute for success or honest pessimism.
184. And certainly the report has been taken seriously. The American Academy of
Political Science devoted its November 1967 issue of the Annals to the Commission report. It is being reviewed by everybody. The American Bar Association has committed
itself to realization of the Commission's program.
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But the Commission's program, if Daniel Moynihan is to be
believed,185 is just one more nail in the coffin being prepared for
liberalism by the New Left. The Commission's more unique contribution must lie in what it has done for or to the crime problem. It
directs us with a free hand to undertake hundreds of activities with
which to while away our time and whittle at our energies and
resources. Since the Commission provided no basis for judging which
activities should be undertaken first, one must predict which recommendations are most likely to lead to action on the basis of importance or logical priority. There will be widespread support for police
getting college degrees-a key proposal of the police section,186 which
James Q. Wilson aptly characterized as nonsense.187 The court system
will get rid of drunk and disorderly cases before other institutions
adequate to handle them are developed.188 Despite our best intentions, people will be held for drunkenness (perhaps through some
form of commitment) for indefinite periods of drying out without
actually being cured. And in due time we will have our analog to
Gault. 189 Because the Commission feared to ask whether morals
should be legislated, we will have wiretapping and bugging as the
only means of fighting the monster created by Prohibition and nurtured by the monopoly of gaming. Police commissioners will spend
their time on, or trying to establish their right to be on, city planning
commissions.190 Police lobbyists will haunt the halls of Congress
seeking expanded federal aid. Magistrates and police court judges
will be sitting on criminal court benches; and the repute of the judiciary, if not the status of those composing it, will sink to unheard of
lows. 191 The business of the misdemeanor courts will be brought to
felony courts and will bring with it all the evils of ovenvork from
which felony courts are now largely protected. In a word, the Com185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Nirvana Now, 36 THE AM. SCHOLAR 539 (1967).
REPORT

109.

The Crime Commission Reports, THE Pun. INTEREST, Fall 1967, at 64, 81.
The recommendations are made in REPORT 233-37.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Some form of holding will almost certainly be
demanded and likely permitted. The Commission itself recommends detention while
under the influence. REPORT 235. Experience with mental institutions indicates many
professionals are unhappy wtih voluntary commitment because at crisis periods in
treatment the patient can choose to walk away, wasting all the investment of treatment resources in him. The commitment approach has also been adopted, despite the
Commission's neutral stand in dealing with federal narcotics cases. See note 92 supra.
190. See REPORT 99.
191. Both these results may be expected as the most likely consequences of unifica•
tion of misdemeanor and felony courts, recommended by the Commission in REPORT
129.
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mission's recommendations will be carried out in exact proportion
as there are those who have something to gain from their achievement. The rest will languish for want of interested proponents. And
the pursuit of self-interest has the Commission's implied approval.
Indeed, its tactic was to appeal to self-interest-a little bit for everybody-in the predictably vain hope that the things nobody is interested in will be carried along in the tide.
Worst of all, the Commission has probably pre-empted for many
years the field of major reassessment of the crime problem. The
Commission was called into being because people were concerned
about crime. It was to substitute for Goldwater's simple answers
some real ones. It was to tell the people of America how to think
about crime and what to do about it. To this task it brought the
prestige of the White House and of its own members. That it
frittered away the corpus of its trust means not only an opportunity
missed but an opportunity foreclosed for others. Where are the
authors to be found? Where the interest and enthusiasm? Having
pre-empted the field, this inadequate report must be our guide
through the years of increasing crime. I think it better we had none.
The vacuum might have raised up a better one.

